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The Rise of Technology and its Influence on Labor Market Outcomes
Maja Thomas
Abstract: Technological progress has significantly changed the inputs and production processes
utilized by firms. Such shifts have led to warnings throughout the past few decades that
substantial numbers of jobs, particularly things belonging to the middle class, would be
eliminated and replaced by technology. This paper examines the validity of this argument by
estimating the impact of technology investment on local labor markets during that period. I find
evidence for a positive, rather than negative, relationship between technology and employment.
Furthermore, my estimates suggest there exists a complementary relationship between
technology investment and growth in labor opportunities, rather than a substitution effect of
workers moving from technology-intensive industries to non-technology intensive sectors
Introduction
The rise of technology, specifically robotics and computerization, has dramatically
shifted the inputs available to businesses over the past several decades. This rapid development
has transformed the production processes for many different industries. Many fear that this
technological development has increased automation while not adding enough jobs to offset the
drop in opportunities. If true, this decrease in the employment capacity would negatively impact
the wages and incomes of many workers, namely middle skill white collar and blue collar labors
performing easily codifiable tasks (Autor 2011).
The subject of automation and its expansion in recent decades has ignited fears and
frustrations over its threat of making many traditional jobs obsolete. Automation has been used
as anecdotal evidence to explain claims of declining productivity, employment, and the current
economic slow growth. The impact of automation has discriminately hit certain industries and
job types, most of which are middle-paying and moderate-skilled, while straying away from
others (Autor 2011). Much of this is because automation is only viable for certain job types, most
of which are middle-paying and moderate-skilled. The core tasks of these positions often require
employees to follow precise methodical procedures which machines are well equipped to
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perform. But is the rise in technology to blame for labor market perils or has it simply provided a
digestible narrative?
Per neoclassical theory, investment would actually increase labor demand due to the
complementary nature of labor and capital. However, many economists consider ICT capital
differently, worrying that investment would decrease the demand for labor by increasing
productivity of labor. Nevertheless, with spillover effects on other industries, incomes, or
aggregate demand (and thus output), the impact of ICT investment is difficult to assess per
traditional theory.
Thus, this paper answers this question empirically, examining the impact of technology
investment on local labor markets. In the next section, I discuss the influence of robotics and job
automation on employment dynamics. In section III, I develop an econometric model to analyze
the relationship between increases the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone and the expected level of employment in that county. In
section IV, I discuss the data collected to test my hypothesis, and in section V, I use that data to
test my hypothesis and find evidence for a positive relationship between investment and
employment.
I.

Job Automation and Labor Market Demand
The interaction between job automation and labor market dynamics has attracted

significant attention from both economists and scholars alike. With vast technological advances
occurring in computing and robotics, machines have now become as or more efficient than
human workers in various environments. Without a clear consensus, economists continue to
question automation’s bearing on the labor market while the public remains largely in fear.
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A negative relationship between the levels of ICT investment and employment would
hardly be surprising. Since the rise of machines and machine learning, many have feared that
robots would replace human labor, leading to employment losses. Straying from traditional
neoclassical framework, economists tend to view ICT investment as a substitute for labor rather
than a compliment. In this case, demand for labor would decrease, thereby reducing
employment. Furthermore, while decreases in job opportunities due to automation could
hypothetically be made up by increases in job opportunities in other industries, labor may not be
able to shift into these new opportunities due to a lack of experience or other structural problems,
thus leading to structural unemployment and an overall decline in employment. These findings
would uphold implications from the Solow growth model, where an increase in technological
investment increases labor productivity (i.e. output per worker). Ceteris paribus, firms would
need less employees and would be incentivized to cut jobs.
This negative relationship between technology investment and labor has been
documented by different parts of the literature. Robots and automated systems have negatively
impacted several occupations, almost entirely eliminating elevator operators, highway toll
collectors, parking attendants, and other similar roles (Quereshi and Syed 2014). Qureshi and
Syed found that in the health care industry, 19 Aethon TUG robots can perform $1 million in
human labor each year for $350,000, saving the industry 65% in labor costs. Robots such as
these, in working two shifts seven days per week, save the labor of 2.8 full time equivalent (FTE)
employees while costing less than one. Ebel (1986) also noted the labor costs savings by
employing robots. Robots in the automotive industry costs around $6 per hour including
depreciation and maintenance costs, compared with between $23 and $24 an hour in wages and
benefits for an employee.
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Contradicting evidence would demonstrate either no significant relationship or a positive
relationship between the commuting zone levels of ICT investment and employment. If there
were no significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables, job losses
would either not result from automation or losses would be made up by gains in other sectors or
occupations. If there were a significant and positive relationship, commuting zone job growth
would result from ICT investment due to aggregate demand effects. This would align with
neoclassical theory, which states that an increase in ITC investment would increase labor
demand because capital and labor are complements. Higher investment would increase
production, leading to an increase in income and increase the demand for goods and services,
overall employing more individuals to produce these goods and services. Additionally, if demand
for output increased because of the technological investment, a decrease in employment resulting
from increases in labor productivity would be offset by an increase in labor demanded to
increase total output. Even if ICT investment and labor were substitutes, there could be spillover
effects (i.e. increases in demand for labor in related industries, impacts of increased income or
aggregate demand, etc.) which could increase employment overall.
Other parts of the literature have found ICT investment to have had a non-negative
impact on the labor market, largely due to spillover effects of ICT investment. Autor (2015)
found that automation had not led to significant job losses, citing that the interaction between
technology and employment required ingenuity and creative thinking that cannot be adequately
computerized. Autor (2011) detailed growing labor market opportunities for both high skill,
high-wage and low skill, low-wage white and blue collar industries, as a result of automation-led
wage-level occupational shifts. As computer and robotics technologies progressed, machines
were well equipped to perform core job tasks of middle skilled industries. However, this has
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caused various spillover effects and led to increases in opportunities in other sectors, and likely
triggered dramatic growth in service occupations as detailed by Autor and Dorn (2013). Such
also appeared the case during the early 2000s, where Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigo (2016)
found that the declines in the manufacturing industry were propped up by the growth in the
housing sector, which benefitted from the decreases in construction costs and increases in
building efficiency. Leontif and Duchin (1984) forecasted the intensive use of automation the
twenty years following 1985, estimating it would conserve about 10% of the labor force required
to produce the same goods. However, their models predicted an increase in the output level
which would offset the effects of job displacement, finding a complementary relationship
between investment and employment as would the neoclassical framework. Furthermore, they
argued the impacts would involve a significant increase in professional employees and a steep
decline in the relative number of clerical workers as a proportion of the labor force.
An even smaller proportion of the literature has found no relationship between ICT
investment and the labor market. Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997) found that time series results
demonstrated little correlation between the adoption of technology and changes in workforce
characteristics. The adoption of new technologies did not appear to impact a factory’s relative
share of non-production labor or high wage workers, as compared to plants which did not adopt
new technologies. This relationship between factory automation technologies and employment of
highly paid workers was further established by Dunne and Schmitz (1995) and Siegel (1995).
Thus, the impact of ICT investment on labor markets could reasonably be either positive
or negative. This paper aims to answer the empirical question of ICT investment’s impact on the
change in employment, differing from the above literature which addresses similar questions
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utilizing historical data and qualitative methods. Further information on the model is detailed in
the next section.
II.

Modeling
I test whether information and communications technology investment in a commuting

zone affects the level of employment in that commuting zone using methods similar to those of
Autor et al (2015). Commuting zones are clusters of US counties characterized by strong withincluster and weak between-cluster ties that have been compiled by the Economic Research
Service in 1990. The average level of information and communications technology investment is
computed annually over the course of two eight year periods: 1992-1999 and 2000-2007.
The benchmark regression can be written as follows:
ܻܱܮܲܯܧǡ௧ ൌ  ߚ   ߚଵ  ܶܵܧܸܰܫ୧୲  ߚଶ ܻܴܣܧ௧  ߚଷ ܴܱܰܫܩܧ௧   ߤ௧

where;
o EMPLOY measures the level of employment within each commuting zone as a
percentage of total employment;
o INVEST represents the average level of information and communications
technology investment over two eight year periods, 1992-1999 and 2000-2007,
respectively, as a percentage of total investment;
o YEAR is a dummy variablse controlling for differences in employment growth
among the two eight-year periods;
o REGION is a vector of dummy variable controlling for differences in
employment among census divisions;
o ߤ is the error term.

From the above regression, the null hypothesis for this model can be written as follows:
H0: ߚଵ  Ͳ
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An increase in the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone does not negatively impact the level of
employment in that commuting zone.
HA: ߚଵ ൏ Ͳ
An increase in the level of information and communications technology
investment within a commuting zone negatively impacts the level of employment
in that commuting zone.
III.

Data
The data in this study comes from the European Union level analysis of Capital, Labor,

Energy, Materials, and Service (EU KLEMS) and David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, and David
Dorn. The unit of analysis in this data set is commuting zone-year (e.g. commuting zone 1002007) and the data is compiled in the years 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. The EU KLEMS data
measures information and communication technology investment and is part of a larger dataset
which includes other variables related to capital, labor, and output from the 1970s to 2007. The
Autor et al dataset was the focus of their 2015 paper and includes commuting zone-level data on
employment and import penetration in the years 1991, 1999, 2007, and 2011. The data used in
this analysis includes their 722 commuting zones and encompasses the entire mainland United
States for the years 1999 through 2007. These commuting zones are clusters of counties with
strong internal commuting ties (Autor 2014). The data sets utilized in creation of this study are
codified by industry and year. Autor employs SIC codes to signify industry type, while EU
KLEMS uses broad sector categories. Thus, to combine the data sets, I recode all SIC codes into
broad sector categories for ease of merging.
My dependent variable is the change in commuting zone employment. As noted above,
commuting zones are clusters of US counties characterized by strong within-cluster and weak
between-cluster ties that have been compiled by the Economic Research Service in 1990.
Employment is defined as the number of employees who are on payroll in the pay period in
9

March of each year. Paid employees consist of full time employees, part time employees,
employees on sick leave, holidays, or vacations. The data used to construct this variable come
from David Autor and the County Business Patterns series from the United States Census. I
utilize industry level employment data within each commuter zone and year and manipulate it to
construct my dependent variable. I start by finding total employment within each commuting
zone by coding a new variable adding each industry together within a commuting zone and
removing duplicate observations, leaving only commuter zone and year. This value is then
divided by number of working age individuals in each commuter zone to construct an
employment-population ratio. I then construct a new variable measuring the change in the
employment population ratio for my two years, 1991-1999 and 2000-2007, which will represent
1999 and 2007, respectively. The data includes 1444 observations ranging from -.093% to
2.697% of total employment across all commuting zones.
The independent variable in this study is the percentage of information and
communication technology, as a share of total investment, within a commuting zone.
Information and communications technology (ICT) is a broad category of technology and can be
used as a proxy for robot-type capital. Calculation of ICT capital is based on the database
described in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) and sourced from EU KLEMS. The independent
variable is constructed by taking the eight-year average of EU KLEMS’ ICT as a percentage of
total investment from years 1991-1999 and 2000-2007. Next, I create a variable representing
employment share of each industry within each commuting zone by dividing industry
employment by total employment within the commuting zone. I then multiply the average ICT
investment by employment share. Finally, I sum the industries to create a weighted average of
ICT investment in each commuting zone and eight-year period. The finalized variable includes
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1444 observations ranging between 9.57% and 23.21% of total investment across all commuting
zones. The correlation coefficient between the independent and dependent variables is -0.2718,
demonstrating a negative relationship between ICT investment and employment and following
the narrative that increases in automation remove jobs from the labor market without adding
sufficient new opportunities.
Nine control variables are utilized in this model: one dummy variable accounting for
changes in employment level due to time period and eight other dummy variables accounting for
changes in employment level due
to geographic region (see Figure 1).
These variables are coded either '0’
or ‘1’. The year dummy is coded
‘1’ for observations which take
place in 1999 and ‘0’ for
observations in 2007. Each
regional dummy is coded ‘0’ if the
commuting zone is not part of that
geographic region and ‘1’ if it is.
No commuting zone can belong to

Figure 1: US Census Divisions
Figure courtesy of the US Energy Information Administration (eia.gov)

more than one geographic region. The Mountain region is omitted in the regression analysis,
leaving a variable to compare the other regions to. A summary of all variables and their
respective descriptive statistics can be seen in the appendix in Table 1.
IV.

Findings
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V.

Appendix Tables 3 and 4

display the results of the models
constructed in this paper; that is, the
impact of an increase in the level of ICT
investment within a commuting zone on
the expected level of employment in that
county using an ordinary least squares

Figure 2: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship

(OLS) regression. At a first glance, there is a substantially negative relationship between
the two, as seen in the scatterplot in Figure 2.
The correlation coefficient is -.2718, again
demonstrating the negative relationship between
the ICT investment and the change in
employment. However, as you I add in control
variables such as year, there emerges, if
anything, a positive relationship. This is
supported by the results of the scatterplots on the left in Figures 3 and 4, where the data is
separated out by year. In the period from 1991 to 1999, there exists a positive
relationship (correlation coefficient of 0.2373) between the level of ICT investment and
the change in employment, which is likely due to the economic boom of the 1990s.
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Then, through the 2000s the relationship becomes slightly negative (correlation
coefficient of -.0809) and less uniform as the market gears up for the Great Recession.
Additionally, the summary statistics (see Table 2) show a higher average change in
employment during the 1991-1999 period (5.90% versus 0.22%) and lower average ICT
investment levels in 1991-1999 than the following eight year period (14.32% versus
16.21%).
While the first glance correlation coefficient supports my hypothesis, the first OLS model
does not; I therefore fail to reject the null hypothesis and cannot conclude that there exists a
negative relationship between ICT investment and employment. The results of the model (see
Table 3a) indicate that there is actually a positive relationship between ICT investment and
employment, although they are not significant at the 5% level. But let us not fetishize the 5%
level—with a p-value of 0.063 we hold reasonably the same assurance in the coefficient as we
would if it were 0.05 or under. These findings suggest that a one-percent increase in the level of
ICT investment within a commuting zone, as a percentage of total investment, would lead to a
0.168% increase in the expected change in
Figure 3: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship,
1991-1999

employment-population ratio in that commuting
zone. These findings dispel fears of
technological unemployment and the narrative
of robots taking human jobs, proving consistent
with the complementarities between ICT
investment and human labor. However, the
small size of the coefficient and borderline
Figure 4: ICT Investment and Employment Relationship,
2000-2007
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significance of its p-value may also be in accordance with Autor’s (2015) findings that there
exists no significant negative relationship between automation and job losses.
I implement various controls for year and region in the model. The regions are comprised
of the following divisions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, south Atlantic, East North Central, West
North Central, East South Central, West South Central, and Pacific. Of the nine control variables
tested in this model, eight are significant below the 5% level: year, New England, Mid Atlantic,
South Atlantic, East North Central, South North Central, West South Central, and Pacific. All
control variables hold negative coefficients except year. This relationship between year and
employment supports the results of the earlier correlation coefficients and scatter plots,
suggesting that employment was expected to be 6% higher in the period from 1991-1999,
regardless of region or ICT investment level.
From the results of the first model, I create a second model to include Autor’s (2014)
import penetration variable to account for differences arising from trade, and assess whether it
was an important omitted variable in the first model (see Table 3b). Upon running the mode, I
find that the change in import penetration, while significant and negative (as in Autor’s findings),
does not substantially change the ICT investment coefficient. The coefficient lowers slightly to
0.160 and keeps significance at the 10% level. Thus, I conclude there exists no problem of
omitted variables present within the first model.
Next, I construct models which estimate the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables in one of the two eight-year periods, to see if the relationships implied by
the scatterplots and correlation coefficients hold true that there are differing impacts on the
relationship between ICT investment and employment which are dependent on the eight-year
period investigated. My first model utilized data only during the 1991-1999, and the results
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demonstrated a strongly significant and positive correlation between the two variables with a
correlation coefficient of 0.566. The results of the 2000-2007 model, however, were negative and
insignificant, even at the 10% level. Thus, the models demonstrate that the gains from ICT
investment were to be made during the 1990s but did not last not through the 2000s, when the
overall employment population ratio tumbled due to the 2001 recession.
Finally, I construct three models to allocate the 27 broad sector industries in each
commuting zone into three categories: ICT intensive investment, moderate ICT intensive
investment, and non-ICT intensive investment. From the year-commuting zone-industry stage of
my data manipulation, I identify the top 9 industries by computing the simple average of the
average ICT investment over the two periods, constructing one value from 1991-2007. Then, I
compute the total employment in each commuter zone for each bracket, leaving 6,498
observations and three new variables corresponding to each ICT investment level. Finally, I find
the change in employment for the two periods and drop the 1991 values from the data set. More
information on the industry breakdown and their respective summary statistics can be found in
Tables 5-7.
The results of the three ICT models (Table 4a-c) suggest that increased ICT investment
positively impacts ICT intensive segments while negatively impacting non-ICT intensive
industries. The ICT intensive model demonstrates a positive and strongly significant relationship
between the two variables, suggesting that a one percent increase in ICT investment will increase
expected employment by .42%. This result further demonstrates the complementarity of ICT
investment to the labor market, particularly its addition to ICT intensive industries. On the other
hand, the expected relationship between ICT investment in non-ICT intensive industries and
employment is significant and negative, with a coefficient of -.21%. This disproves the idea that
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the increase in employment in the first model was the result of a substitution effect in non-ICT
intensive industries. The moderate ICT investment model is insignificant, with a near-zero
coefficient that implies no definite relationship between ICT investment and employment. This
coefficient is in line with the results of the other two models because of the complementary
relationship between intensiveness and employment and substitute relationship between nonintensiveness and employment.
However, the results of the three categorical models may indicate an omitted variables
bias problem in the models. If an industry category—ICT intensive, for example—expands,
companies may concurrently hire more employees and invest in ICT. In this case, the
relationship between ICT investment and change in employment would necessarily be causal,
but a response to a third variable which is driving expansion in that sector. Instituting an
additional variable to control for this difference would solve this potential problem, but I could
not conceive of any measurable instruments to utilize in the model. Thus, further research should
attempt to correct for hypothetical bias by using an instrument correlated with ICT investment
and not directly linked with employment in those industries.
I was unable to account for all possible influences on level of commuting zone
employment which could misconstrue the relationship between the dependent variable and
commuter zone ICT investment. Particularly, there is no control for the type of industry
employment or the makeup of commuter zone employment in the first model, and the three
models which consider industries only do so using intensive, moderately intensive, and nonintensive ICT brackets. However, it is unclear whether the addition of this variable would
actually significantly impact the results of the model, and there would exist difficulties in coding
this variable for all industries included in the initial dataset. Additionally, research conducted by
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Autor et al (2015) did not find industry to have a significant impact in their model. Nevertheless,
while the model demonstrates a significant relationship between the dependent and independent
variables, there could exist an omitted variable or variables which impact the findings of the
model.
As ICT investment is a relatively broad category of technology, further research may be
needed to look specifically at the impacts of robotics and possible resulting job automation. In
the creation of this model, ICT investment appears to be an adequate proxy for robotics.
However, it may be that another indicator of robotics development could have been better served
to estimate the model, as it would analyze the funding on specifically technologies which could
be used to automate tasks. Additionally, further research should aim to include a larger number
of years so as to compute both the change in employment and change in investment. This would
allow the model to analyze the impacts of increasing investment in ICT technologies on
employment rather than average level. Using an independent variable measuring its change,
would, regardless of impact, have more straightforward policy implications.
VI.

Concluding Remarks
Job automation and its growth in recent decades have awakened suspicions and

frustrations over their risk of making many traditional jobs obsolete and decreasing employment
opportunities for the newly jobless. Yet, according to the results of the model, this does not seem
to be the case. The findings from this paper challenge my hypothesis of a negative relationship
between the dependent and independent variables, instead suggesting that an increase in the level
of ICT investment within a commuting zone, as a percentage of total investment, would lead to
an increase in the expected employment population ratio in that commuting zone. These results
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are significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.063. Thus, the findings ultimately indicate
that ICT investment leads to increased employment.
From these findings, policy recommendations are less than straightforward; the first
model dictates that increasing ICT investment would push employment in commuter zones, but
due to differences in the two time periods tested and the negative and insignificant coefficient in
the third and fourth models, implications for the current slow growth era may be not be effective.
However, the differences may be due to the 2001 recession and decrease in growth. Thus, further
research is recommended to determine whether periods of slow growth can receive the
employment benefits of ICT investment. This paper does not attempt to define the correct limit
of spending nor does it serve to understand the optimal distribution of ICT investment by
industry. What this paper does, however, is dispel fears of a negative relationship between the
two variables.
The US labor market remains a major source of discussion, particularly as the economy
has been plagued by slow growth. While the official unemployment rate was 4.9% as of October
2016, the labor force participation rate and employment-population ratio remain far below pre2007 levels. A struggling labor market in the aftermath of recession and dramatic rise in
technology have caused many to couple the two together, and fear that technological
developments have contributed to unemployment rates. However, the use of technology appears
to be a scapegoat for other issues putting downward pressure on the labor market. The rise of the
service sector, as noted by Autor and Dorn (2013) has allowed another outlet for American
workers. The results of the models tested in this paper, however, demonstrate a complementary
relationship between ICT investment and growth in labor opportunities, rather than a substitution
effect of workers moving from ICT-intensive industries to non-ICT intensive sectors. Thus, the
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public should embrace—rather than fear—information and communication technology
investment as a way in which to spur growth and expand labor market opportunities.
VII.

Appendix

Table 1: Summary of Variables
Variable

Description

Observations

Source

Employment

Employment within czone as

1444 observations

Autor et al.

percentage of total employment

1999, 2007

Average level of ICT investment as

1444 observations

percentage of total investment over

1992-1999, 2000-2007

ICT Investment

EU KLEMS

eight year periods
Year

Dummy variable representing either

1444 observations

1999 (‘0’) or 2007 (‘1’)

1999, 2007

New England

Dummy variable representing New

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

England czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

Mid-Atlantic

Dummy variable representing Mid-

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

Atlantic czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

East North Central

Dummy variable representing East

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

North Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

West North

Dummy variable representing West

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Central Division

North Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

East South Central

Dummy variable representing East

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Division

South Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

West South

Dummy variable representing West

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Central Division

South Central czones

1999, 2007

Business Patterns
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Autor et al/EU KLEMS

Pacific Division

Dummy variable representing

1444 observations

Census Bureau County

Pacific czones.

1999, 2007

Business Patterns

Table 2: Summary of Independent and Dependent Variables by Year

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

ICT investment 1991-1999

14.32083

.28453

9.5747

20.0174

ICT investment 2000-2007

16.21238

1.396903

9.9275

23.2145

Change in employment,

5.90318

4.114131

-9.162831

27.81029

.2150155

4.606847

-23.85641

22.99899

1991-1999

Change in Employment,
2000-2007

Table 3: Regression Analysis: ICT Investment Across All Levels
Variable

(a) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment

(b) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment
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(c) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment in
1999

(d) OLS regression
Change in
commuting zone
employment in 2007

IT investment in
commuting zone

.167
(.090)

.160
(.089)

Year

6.01***
(.279)

5.407***
(.287)

Import
penetration

.566***
(.124)

-.116
(.119)

-.971***
(.136)

New England

-1.67*
(.813)

-1.049
(.804)

.833
(1.051)

-4.251***
1.126

Mid Atlantic

-3.201***
(.678)

-2.389***
(.676)

-3.292***
(.878)

-3.253**
(.938)

South Atlantic

-3.152***
(.419)

-2.443***
(.424)

-.732
(.542)

-5.572***
(.580)

East North
Central

-2.728***
(.456)

-2.017***
(.459)

.753
(.592)

-6.343***
(.629)

West North
Central

-.239
(.400)

.181
(.398)

1.142*
(.525)

-1.840**
(.548)

East South
Central

-2.756***
(.464)

-1.439**
(.493)

-.384
(.600)

-5.141***
(.643)

West South
Central

-1.471***
(.418)

-1.080**
(.415)

-1.317*
(.542)

-1.735**
(.577)

Pacific

-2.487**
(.541)

-2.279***
(.533)

-2.710***
(.701)

-2.307**
(.749)

Constant

-0.688**
(1.439)

-.213
(1.417)

-1.941
(1.732)

5.224**
(1.896)

N
R2

1444
.358

1444
.380

721
0.142

722
0.218

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 4: Regression Analysis: ICT Investment Across All Levels
(a) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
high ICT industries

(b) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
mid ICT industries

(c) OLS regression
Change in commuting
zone employment for
low ICT industries

IT investment in
commuting zone

.425***
(.060)

-.056
(.041)

-.209***
(.0459)

Year

3.773***
(.185)

1.77***
(.129)

.456***
(.142)

New England

-1.214*
(.539)

-.373
(.375)

-.128
(.413)

Mid Atlantic

-1.978***
(.449)

-.965**
(.313)

-.317
(.345)

South Atlantic

-.868**
(.278)

-.719***
(.193)

-1.560***
(.213)

East North Central

-1.704***
(.302)

-1.106***
(.210)

.115
(.232)

West North Central

-.928***
(.265)

.171
(.185)

.558**
(.203)

East South Central

-1.223***
(.308)

-.422*
(.214)

-1.098***
(.236)

West South Central

-1.163***
(.277)

-.449*
(.193)

.143
(.212)

Pacific

-1.087**
(.359)

-.871***
(.250)

-.484
(.274)

Constant

-5.77***
(.953)

1.561*
(.664)

3.459
(.731)

N
R2

1444
.257

1444
.225

1444
0.137

Variable

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
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Table 5: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: ICT Intensive Industries

ICT-Intensive Industry
Name

Transport and storage
Education
Electrical and optical
equipment
Machinery, nec
Financial intermediation
Wholesale trade and
commission trade
Transport equipment
Construction
Community social and
personal services

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

26

0.229

0.374

0.360

35

0.300

0.349

0.344

15

0.238

0.345

0.335

14

0.244

0.308

0.302

29

0.297

0.248

0.253

22

0.226

0.246

0.244

16

0.204

0.239

0.235

19

0.138

0.205

0.198

33

0.165

0.178

0.176
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Table 6: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: Moderate ICT Intensive Industries

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

7

0.132

0.170

0.166

Manufacturing nec;
recycling

17

0.163

0.166

0.166

Health and social work

36

0.149

0.153

0.152

Chemicals and chemical
products

10

0.135

0.146

0.145

Retail trade, repair of
household goods

23

0.124

0.132

0.131

21

0.129

0.115

0.117

13

0.101

0.102

0.102

Coke, refined petroleum
and nuclear fuel

9

0.097

0.099

0.099

Other non-metallic
mineral

12

0.089

0.094

0.093

Moderate ICT Industry
Name
Pulp, paper, paper,
printing and publishing

Sale, maintenance and
repair of motor vehicles
and motorcycles
Basic metals and
fabricated metal
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Table 7:: ICT Level Industry Breakdown: non-ICT Intensive Industries

Non-ICT Intensive
Industry Name

Broad
Sector
Code

Average ICT
Investment, 19911999

Average ICT
Investment, 20002007

Average ICT
Investment, 19912007

Food, beverages and
tobacco

4

0.076

0.091

0.090

Textiles, textile, leather
and footwear

5

0.065

0.091

0.088

Real estate, renting and
business activities

30

0.068

0.073

0.072

Electricity, gas and water
supply

18

0.062

0.070

0.069

Wood and of wood and
cork

6

0.059

0.066

0.065

11

0.045

0.061

0.059

24

0.044

0.050

0.049

2

0.061

0.040

0.042

1

0.014

0.018

0.018

Rubber and plastics
Hotels and restaurants
Mining and quarrying
Agriculture, hunting,
forestry and fishing
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The Impact of Aid on the Economic Growth of Developing Countries (LDCs) in SubSaharan Africa
Maurice Phiri
Abstract: Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of Sub-Saharan African have been recipients of
official development assistance for more than 5 decades; however they are still characterized by
chronic problems of poverty, low living standards and weak economic growth. The hot question
is: Is aid effective in promoting economic growth? Thus, this paper investigates the impact of
aid on the economic growth of 12 least developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over a period
of 20 years. I take a fixed effects instrumental variable approach and the results imply that aid
has a statistically insignificant negative impact on economic growth. I therefore conclude that aid
is ineffective in promoting growth, perhaps due to misallocation of aid or inefficient use.
1. Introduction
The fundamental role of foreign aid, given in the form of loans and grants, is to mitigate
poverty and promote economic growth in developing countries. However, the results of official
development assistance (foreign aid) have not universally met the fundamental objective of aid
in different countries (Lohani 2004). According to Dambisa Moyo, Zambian economist and
author of Dead Aid,
Over the past 60 years at least $1 trillion of development-related aid has been transferred
from rich countries to Africa. Yet real per-capita income today is lower than it was in the
1970s, and more than 50% of the population -- over 350 million people -- live on less
than a dollar a day, a figure that has nearly doubled in two decades” (Moyo 2009).
Proponents of aid argue that aid has a positive impact on economic growth for the following
reasons: 1) aid supplements domestic savings and capital formation; 2) it can close the foreign
exchange gap (Fayissa and El-kaissy, 1999). 3) In Askarov and Doucouliagos’ 2015 study, (cited
in Morrissey 2001), “Aid can increase investment in physical and human capital. 4) Aid is also
associated with technological transfer that increases capital productivity and promotes
endogenous technical change.”
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On the other hand, opponents of aid argue that foreign aid is ineffective in Africa for
several reasons including: 1) it comes at a cost and heavily in debts African governments; 2) it
perpetrates corruption when aid is given to corrupt governments; 3) it increases dependency
syndrome and weakens governments’ efforts of collecting revenue; 4) large inflows of foreign
currency can strengthen the recipients’ domestic currency and raise its export prices, in turn
making the country less competitive in the global market (Moyo 2009).
Furthermore, prior research on the impact of aid on economic growth is not unanimous.
Hansen and Tarp (2000) found that effectiveness of aid is dependent on human capital and
investment. Malik (2008) found that aid is not effective in the short run and has a negative effect
on growth in the long run. Minoiu and Reddy (2009) found that effectiveness of aid is
conditional on whether the aid is developmental or not. Also, there are several common
challenges that face the empirical investigations of the effectiveness of aid including: 1)
accounting for the lagged effect of aid on growth; 2), properly accounting for the two-way causal
relationship between aid and growth and 3), properly controlling for the underlying
heterogeneity of countries used in regression analysis (Askarov and Doucouliagos 2015). The
study of the effectiveness of aid on economic growth is important because it can help donor
countries and aid recipients understand how aid can be effectively used to alleviate poverty and
attain sustainable economic growth in the least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.
The results of my study support the argument that aid is ineffective for economic growth
in least developed countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, after correcting for problems
like time fixed effects, heteroscedasticity, unit roots and endogeneity in my model, a percentage
increase in net official development assistance (ODA) is associated with a 0.03% decrease in real
gross domestic product (GDP); this is not statistically different from 0. However, real total factor
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productivity and capital accumulation have one of the largest statistically significant impacts on
real GDP and therefore I argue that proper allocation of aid in the economy makes aid very
effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses existing literature and
my contribution to it. Section 3 gives an overview of the methods I have used in this study, while
section 4 explains where I got my data and describes the nature of the data set used in this study.
A discussion of my analysis and interpretation of my results is given in section 5 and finally,
section 6 discusses my conclusion based on the empirical results of this paper.
2. Literature Review
Prior empirical economic literature on the relationship between aid and growth in
developing countries is mixed. Mallik (2008) uses co-integration analysis to study the
relationship of foreign aid and economic growth of the poorest six African countries. In 5 out the
6 countries, Mallik found aid has no significant effect on growth in the short run, while there is a
significant negative relationship between aid and growth in the long run.
Hansen and Tarp (2000), conducted a cross country study using a growth model that
captures non-linear effects between aid and growth. Their results show that when human capital
and investment are not controlled for, aid increases economic growth, but with decreasing
returns. Hansen and Tarp conclude that capital accumulation is the channel through which aid
impacts growth. In another cross country study, Minoiu and Reddy (2009) structured their
research by looking at the effect of two kinds of aid (developmental and non-developmental aid)
on per capita GDP growth over long periods. Their results indicate that developmental aid has a
positive, large and robust effect on economic growth, while the effect of non-developmental aid
on economic growth is mostly neutral and occasionally negative.
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On the other hand, Ouattara (2006) uses panel data technique to study the effect of aid on
fiscal behavior given that aid is channeled through the public sector and its effect on the
economy is contingent on how it is used by the public sector. Ouattara’s empirical results suggest
that aid has a significant positive impact on public investment and developmental expenditure,
while it has a significant negative relationship with non-developmental expenditure. In addition,
Tavares (2002) studied the impact of foreign aid on corruption and found that aid has a robust
significant negative relationship with corruption.
I add to the existing economic literature by using an instrumental variable approach
where I use percentage of population with access to improved water source as an instrumental
variable for foreign aid. There are a lot of studies that have taken the instrumental variable
approach: for instance Brückner (2009) used rainfall as an instrumental variable to study the
impact of growth on Aid; Rahajan and Subramanian (2008) used colonial links and relative
population size of the donor to recipient; and Magesan (2015) used Participation in United
Nation’s Human Rights Treaties. However, I am not aware of any study that uses the
instrumental variable I have exploited in this paper. Some prior studies that have used the
instrumental variable approach have been criticized for using weak and invalid instruments
(Magesan, 2015). Some instrumental variables used in prior studies have been criticized on two
to three grounds: 1) high collinearity with aid (e.g. lagged aid, lagged aid squared); 2) not truly
exogenous to the economy (e.g. lagged GDP per capita, lagged arms imports) and 3) time
invariance (Werker et. Al 2008).
3. Methodology
The objective of this paper is to study the impact of foreign aid on the economic growth
of some least developed countries (LDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this study, I use the Solow
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Growth Model’s aggregate production function as a guide to structure my regression model.
According to Solow Growth Model’s aggregate production function, output is a function of
capital accumulation (K), labor force/ Population (N) and state of technology (A) (Blanchard and
Johnson, 2013). This is written out as

ൌ ሺǡǡሻǤ
I use Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to estimate technological progress or state of technology.
According to Comin, “Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by
the amount of inputs used in production” (Comin 2006). The Solow residual defined as

െȽכെሺͳെȽሻכ
is used as a measurement for TFP growth, where gY denotes the growth rate of aggregate output,
gK the growth rate of aggregate capital, gL the growth rate of aggregate labor and alpha the
capital share (Comin 2006). TFP is multidimensional and some of its important determinants
include human capital, physical infrastructure, institutions (political and economic), financial
development, geographical predicament and absorptive capacity (Issakson 2007).Cognizant that
TFP accounts for both political and economic institutions, I use TFP to control for quality of
government, nature of policies and corruption which appear to be determinants of aid
effectiveness (Fayissa and El-Kaissy 1999).
Furthermore, I include the variable “net exports” in my model since it is argued that
increasing Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade share in the world can outweigh the impact of aid.
According to One, “Sub-Saharan Africa’s tiny share (3.5%) of global exports was worth
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approximately $442 billion in 2014, around 10 times the amount of aid the region received the
same year1.” Hence my primary model in this study:

݀݃ݎ௧ ൌ  ߚ   ߚଵ ܰ݁ܣܦܱݐ௧  ߚଶ ܰ݁ݔܧݐ௧  ߚଷ ݂ݐݎ௧  ߚସ ݇ܿݐݏ݇ݎ௧
 ߚହ ௧  ݑ௧ 
Where rgdp is real gdp (as a measure of economic growth), NetODA is net official development
assistance received (measure of aid), NetExp is trade balance, rtfp is total factor productivity,
rkstock is capital stock, pop is population and u is the error term.
I use different regression methods that potentially correct for heteroscedasticity, unit
roots, trending behavior, serial correlation, unobserved fixed variables and endogeneity. I then
compare these regressions and make a conclusion. My main contribution to the existing literature
is my instrumental variable approach where I use percentage of population with access to
improved water sources (H20_pop) as an instrumental variable for foreign aid. Human wellbeing indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy etc. rather than
macroeconomic indicators are the recommended determinants of aid allocation to a country
(Fayissa and El-Kaissy 1999). On the other hand, real GDP only accounts for total final output in
the economy. Therefore, theoretically, percentage of population with access to improved water
sources is not used in the accounting of real GDP; however it is a wellbeing indicator that can
potentially be used to determine aid allocation. Therefore, I suspect that H20_pop is highly
correlated with aid, but is not directly correlated with real GDP and therefore is uncorrelated
with the error term of my model.

1

One. “Trade and Investment” http://www.one.org/international/issues/trade-andinvestment/
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4. Data
My study uses panel data for 12 African countries over the span of 20 years (1995 –
2014). All the data used in this study is from Penn World Table version 9.0 and the World
Bank’s Database: World Development Indicators. The African countries of interest are Benin,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Lesotho, Sierra Leone,
Tanzania, Togo and Sudan. My key variables from Penn World Table 9.0 include real gross
domestic product (GDP) at constant national prices (in million 2011US$); total factor
productivity at constant national prices (2011=1); capital stock at constant national prices (in
million. 2011US$); and Population (in millions). Data on the following variables are from the
World Bank’s Database: net official development assistance received (as percentage of gross
national income (GNI); external balance on goods and services (percent of GDP), commonly
referred to as trade balance or net exports; and improved water source (percent of population
with access).
The summary statistics of these key variables are presented in Table 1. During 1995 to
2014, the average net official development assistance received was 13.15 % of GNI while the
average real GDP of these African countries was US$ 25707.81 Million (constant 2011 US$).
The mean on net exports (-19.75 % of GDP) implies that these African countries have, on
average, been running trade deficits for 20 years. On the other hand, only 53.8% of the total
population of these African countries, on average, has access to improved water sources.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Key Variables 㻌
Variable

Observations Mean

Minimum

Maximum

13.15

Standard
Deviation
8.61

Net ODA received
(% of GNI)

240

1.22

53.48

Real GDP (Constant
2011 Million US$)

240

25707.81

37874.27

2546.94

180328.80

Net Exports (% of
GDP)
Capital Stock
(Constant 2011
Million US$)
Total Factor
Productivity

239

-19.75

20.44

-118.26

6.10

240

63160.07

95285.89

6654.39

512623.80

240

0.95

0.15

0.56

1.28

Population (Millions) 240

13.73

12.75

1.75

50.44

Access to Water (%
of Population)

62.06

11.84

35.70

82.10

240

5. Analysis and Results
Table 2: Preliminary Regression
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

2.9595e+11
4.6470e+10

5
233

5.9191e+10
199442183

Total

3.4242e+11

238

1.4388e+09

rgdp

Coef.

net_oda
net_Exp
rtfp
rkstock
pop
_cons

-503.3378
2.259717
20967.31
.1031206
1892.539
-19997.76

Std. Err.
128.9794
52.0087
7186.75
.0199218
148.8858
8474.099

t
-3.90
0.04
2.92
5.18
12.71
-2.36

35

Number of obs
F(5, 233)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.000
0.965
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.019

=
=
=
=
=
=

239
296.78
0.0000
0.8643
0.8614
14122

[95% Conf. Interval]
-757.4528
-100.2077
6807.996
.0638707
1599.205
-36693.41

-249.2229
104.7271
35126.63
.1423704
2185.874
-3302.11

Preliminary regression results show that aid and real GDP has a negative relationship
where a one point increase in net ODA reduces real GDP by US$ 503.34 and this coefficient is
statistically significant from zero. The rest of the independent variables have statistically
significant positive coefficients, except for the coefficient on net exports which has a statistically
insignificant positive coefficient. However, there is evidence of heteroscedasticity, serial
correlation, non-stationarity, unit roots and trending behavior in this regression output - the
specific tests for these problems are included in the appendix. Thus, I potentially correct for
these problems by running a first differenced as well as a de-trended regression using robust
standard errors and logged variables – except for net exports because it has negative values.
Table 3: De-trended Regression
Linear regression

Number of obs
F(5, 233)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

lrgdp_dt

Coef.

lnetODA_dt
netEXP_dt
lrtfp_dt
lrkstock_dt
lpop_dt
_cons

-.1198737
.0006892
1.200889
.4601635
.5660361
.0008038

Robust
Std. Err.

t

.0306706
.0006669
.1096828
.0228998
.0266018
.0124336

-3.91
1.03
10.95
20.09
21.28
0.06

P>|t|
0.000
0.303
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.949

=
=
=
=
=

239
1282.46
0.0000
0.9652
.19139

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1803007
-.0006248
.9847921
.4150463
.5136252
-.0236929

-.0594466
.0020032
1.416986
.5052806
.6184469
.0253006

The results from the regression of de-trended show that there is still a negative
relationship between aid and real GDP where a percentage increase in aid reduces real GDP by
0.12% and the coefficient is statistically different from zero. Surprisingly the coefficient on net
exports is not practically and statistically significant from zero. The rest of the independent
variables have statistically significant positive coefficients. Furthermore, the first differenced
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regression yields similar results to the regression of de-trended variables as far as the sign,
magnitude and significance of coefficients estimates are concerned. See first differenced
regression output below:
Table 4: First Differenced Regression
Linear regression

Number of obs
F(5, 231)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

clrgdp

Coef.

clnetODA
dnetEXP
clrtfp
clrkstock
clpop
_cons

-.0670772
.0008234
1.058939
.5049199
.5192678
.0016393

Robust
Std. Err.
.0402963
.0010942
.1812455
.1021231
.1409524
.0052268

t
-1.66
0.75
5.84
4.94
3.68
0.31

P>|t|
0.097
0.453
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.754

=
=
=
=
=

237
212.31
0.0000
0.9567
.07791

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1464724
-.0013326
.701833
.3037081
.2415512
-.008659

.012318
.0029793
1.416044
.7061316
.7969843
.0119375

On the other hand, Cognizant that the countries in my model are heterogeneous, I also
estimate my model using time and country fixed effects to net out unobserved fixed variables.
The results show that all my dependent variables have a positive relationship with real GDP
except for aid and net exports. Also, all the coefficient estimates of my model are statistically
significant from zero. However, the negative coefficients on net exports does not make sense as a
majority of the economies of LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are tethered to commodity prices of
their exports; Rodrik (2007) asserts that there is a direct relationship between the profitability of
a country’s tradable commodities and economic growth. The coefficient on net official
development assistance suggests that a percentage increase in net ODA reduces real GDP by
0.03%, while TFP has the largest impact on real GDP. A percentage increase of TFP increases
real GDP by 0.91%. See Table below
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Table 5: Fixed Effects Regression
i.country
i.year

_Icountry_1-12
_Iyear_1995-2014

(_Icountry_1 for country==Benin omitted)
(naturally coded; _Iyear_1995 omitted)

Linear regression

Number of obs
F(35, 203)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

lrgdp

Coef.

lnet_oda
net_Exp
lrtfp
lrkstock
lpop
_Icountry_2
_Icountry_3
_Icountry_4
_Icountry_5
_Icountry_6
_Icountry_7
_Icountry_8
_Icountry_9
_Icountry_10
_Icountry_11
_Icountry_12
_Iyear_1996
_Iyear_1997
_Iyear_1998
_Iyear_1999
_Iyear_2000
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
_Iyear_2011
_Iyear_2012
_Iyear_2013
_Iyear_2014
_cons

-.0254101
-.0006843
.9099721
.3660657
.6720259
-.0944086
-.3446654
.0502099
.3693702
-.2784852
.0663196
.007316
.0124697
.5017463
-.079905
-.2371432
.006397
-.0122268
.0055923
.0148259
.0277451
.0202424
.0339268
.0315997
.0390008
.0385662
.0546239
.0616927
.0628272
.0609339
.0730919
.0833452
.0866613
.1004795
.1135807
4.260529

Robust
Std. Err.
.0054001
.0002782
.018708
.011382
.0875759
.0459574
.0217897
.1385289
.0836801
.0865143
.0163586
.0301465
.0447454
.1383099
.1388949
.0356729
.0126093
.0169176
.0126349
.0138954
.0156064
.0170877
.0190738
.0215682
.0244625
.0261948
.0280784
.0306953
.032922
.0353162
.037615
.0396493
.0418423
.0445913
.0480149
.2091888

t
-4.71
-2.46
48.64
32.16
7.67
-2.05
-15.82
0.36
4.41
-3.22
4.05
0.24
0.28
3.63
-0.58
-6.65
0.51
-0.72
0.44
1.07
1.78
1.18
1.78
1.47
1.59
1.47
1.95
2.01
1.91
1.73
1.94
2.10
2.07
2.25
2.37
20.37
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P>|t|
0.000
0.015
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.041
0.000
0.717
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.808
0.781
0.000
0.566
0.000
0.612
0.471
0.659
0.287
0.077
0.238
0.077
0.144
0.112
0.142
0.053
0.046
0.058
0.086
0.053
0.037
0.040
0.025
0.019
0.000

=
=
=
=
=

239
18513.81
0.0000
0.9995
.02532

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.0360576
-.0012327
.8730851
.3436237
.4993509
-.1850236
-.3876285
-.2229301
.2043766
-.449067
.0340651
-.0521243
-.0757556
.229038
-.3537667
-.3074801
-.018465
-.0455837
-.0193202
-.0125719
-.0030264
-.0134498
-.0036813
-.0109267
-.0092324
-.0130825
-.0007388
.0011703
-.0020857
-.0086996
-.0010744
.005168
.0041599
.012558
.0189089
3.848068

-.0147626
-.0001358
.9468591
.3885077
.8447009
-.0037935
-.3017024
.3233499
.5343637
-.1079034
.0985741
.0667564
.1006949
.7744546
.1939567
-.1668063
.031259
.02113
.0305047
.0422237
.0585165
.0539346
.0715349
.0741261
.087234
.0902149
.1099867
.1222151
.1277401
.1305675
.1472581
.1615224
.1691626
.188401
.2082525
4.672991

However, I suspect that foreign aid and real GDP have a spurious relationship, or there
might be some underlying endogeneity in the model. This is because the economic performance
of a developing country can determine if aid should be allocated to it and on the other hand
foreign aid has an effect on GDP through different channels in the economic structure of the
country. In order to correct for this problem I use improved water source (percent of population
with access to improved water source) as an instrumental variable for aid. As a robustness check
of my instrumental variable I ran a regression of log (net ODA) on log( H2O_pop) and other
dependent variables that affect aid or have been used in prior research as instrumental variables
as cited in Werker et. Al 2008.
Table 6: Instrumental Variable Quality
Linear regression

Number of obs
F(5, 233)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

lnet_oda

Coef.

lh2o_pop
lrgdp
lrgdp_1
lpop
year
_cons

-1.009491
-.980642
.1502587
.6916483
.0244286
-36.11949

Robust
Std. Err.
.1650581
.104675
.087444
.0627507
.0068967
13.37586

t
-6.12
-9.37
1.72
11.02
3.54
-2.70

P>|t|
0.000
0.000
0.087
0.000
0.000
0.007

=
=
=
=
=

239
49.77
0.0000
0.4849
.50304

[95% Conf. Interval]
-1.334688
-1.186872
-.0220233
.5680171
.0108408
-62.47257

-.6842939
-.7744116
.3225406
.8152795
.0380165
-9.766407

The results make intuitive sense: as percentage of people with access to improved water
sources increases, net ODA decreases. The coefficient on real GDP implies that as the economic
performance of the country improves the amount of aid decreases. This was the case of
Botswana after it gained its independence; the role of aid decreased as revenues from diamond
mining increased (Togo and Wada 2008).
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Table 7: Fixed Effects IV Regression
. xtivreg lrgdp (lnet_oda = lh2o_pop) net_Exp lrtfp lrkstock lpop, fe vce(robust
> )
Fixed-effects (within) IV regression
Group variable: ccode

Number of obs
Number of groups

R-sq:

Obs per group:
within = 0.9942
between = 0.9346
overall = 0.9390

corr(u_i, Xb)

=
=

239
12

min =
avg =
max =

19
19.9
20

=
=

4.45e+06
0.0000

Wald chi2(5)
Prob > chi2

= -0.3985

(Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in ccode)
Robust
Std. Err.

lrgdp

Coef.

lnet_oda
net_Exp
lrtfp
lrkstock
lpop
_cons

-.0309319
-.0003928
.9020897
.3769718
.8541086
3.801544

.0542281
.0005298
.0392832
.0249396
.0494813
.2827884

sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

.29751608
.0261815
.99231546

(fraction of variance due to u_i)

Instrumented:
Instruments:

z
-0.57
-0.74
22.96
15.12
17.26
13.44

P>|z|
0.568
0.458
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.137217
-.0014313
.8250961
.3280912
.757127
3.247289

.0753533
.0006456
.9790834
.4258525
.9510901
4.355799

lnet_oda
net_Exp lrtfp lrkstock lpop lh2o_pop

The regression results of the fixed effect (within) IV regression show that all the
dependent variables have a positive relationship with real GDP, except for net exports and net
ODA. Also, all the coefficients of the variables are statistically significant, except for net exports
and net ODA. The coefficient estimates are similar to the coefficient estimates of the regression
with time and country fixed effects. The IV (within) fixed effects model also implies that a
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percentage increase in net ODA reduces real GDP by 0.03%. However, there is not enough
evidence to support this relationship as the coefficient on net ODA is statistically insignificant.
In contrast, the TFP, capital stock and population coefficient estimates are practically significant
and support macroeconomic theory. For instance, according to macroeconomic theory a
country’s labor force increases as the population of the country increases and hence in the long
run when a country reaches its steady state, output grows at the growth rate of technology
(estimated by total factor productivity in my model) and population growth (Blanchard and
Johnson, 2013).
Table 8: Fixed Effects IV Regression (Using detrended Variables)
. xtivreg lrgdp_dt (lnetODA_dt = lwater_dt)
> _dt, fe vce(robust)

netEXP_dt lrtfp_dt lrkstock_dt lpop

Fixed-effects (within) IV regression
Group variable: ccode

Number of obs
Number of groups

R-sq:

Obs per group:
within = 0.9592
between = 0.9487
overall = 0.9485

corr(u_i, Xb)

=
=

239
12

min =
avg =
max =

19
19.9
20

=
=

2254.47
0.0000

Wald chi2(5)
Prob > chi2

= 0.2218

(Std. Err. adjusted for 12 clusters in ccode)
Robust
Std. Err.

lrgdp_dt

Coef.

lnetODA_dt
netEXP_dt
lrtfp_dt
lrkstock_dt
lpop_dt
_cons

-.0238895
-.0007491
.9084642
.3712589
.6691325
-.0000394

.0496233
.0003594
.0443209
.0248677
.0813287
.0007549

sigma_u
sigma_e
rho

.24443658
.02526101
.98943291

(fraction of variance due to u_i)

Instrumented:
Instruments:

z
-0.48
-2.08
20.50
14.93
8.23
-0.05

P>|z|
0.630
0.037
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.958

[95% Conf. Interval]
-.1211494
-.0014535
.8215969
.322519
.5097312
-.0015191

lnetODA_dt
netEXP_dt lrtfp_dt lrkstock_dt lpop_dt lwater_dt
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.0733703
-.0000448
.9953316
.4199988
.8285339
.0014402

As a robustness check I also ran fixed effects within instrumental variable regression
using de-trended variables since most of the variables trend with time. The coefficients are
similar to the regression results in table 7, however, the coefficient on net exports is now
statistically significant at the 5 % level. Again, the coefficient on net exports doesn’t make sense,
nevertheless its coefficient is not practically significant. A summary of my regression approaches
is presented in Table 9.
Conclusion
My study investigates the impact of aid (official development assistance) using panel data
for 12 least developed countries (LDCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa observed over a period of 20
years (1995 – 2014). An understanding of the historical context of aid given to Africa or
developing countries in general might be helpful in interpreting the story that my data supports.
According to Moyo 2009, starting from the 1980’s, multilateral aid was given in order to help
indebted developing countries meet their debt obligations as many countries had accumulated a
lot of debt following the oil crisis of the 1970’s. However, multilateral aid like budgetary support
was provided on condition that developing countries implement policy reforms in order to
promote free market systems and good governance. This is in contrast to aid that was given in
the 1960’s which primarily focused on building physical infrastructure like airports, roads, power
stations, telecommunications, schools, health centers among others (Moyo 2009).
My regression results imply that that a percentage increase in net official development
assistances reduces real GDP by about 0.03%. However, this is statistically not different from
zero and arguably practically insignificant as well. Thus, there is not enough evidence to support
this relationship; therefore this goes to show that aid that was transferred around this period
(1995 – 2014) was ineffective towards achieving high levels of economic growth. My results
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also show that TFP, capital accumulation and population have one of the largest impacts on
economic growth. For instance, in the fixed-effect (within) IV regression, a percentage increase
in TFP increases GDP by 0.9% and a percentage increase in capital stock increases economic
growth by 0.38%. Therefore if aid is inefficient in increasing economic growth over a long-run,
it must be the case that it is being misallocated in the economy or it is practically doing little to
promote robust capital accumulation, technological progress and labor force participation.
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Appendix
Table 9. Summary of Regression Analysis of the effect of aid (net ODA) on real GDP
Dependent Variable: Log (Real GDP) Time Period: 1995 - 2014
1st
De-trended Fixed
Fixed Effects IV Fixed Effects IV
Differenced
Effects
Regression
Regression (De(Time and
Trended)
Country)
log (Net ODA) - 0.0671*
- 0.1199*** - 0.0254***
- 0.0309
- 0.024
[0.0403]
[0.0307]
[.0054]
[0.054]
[0.05]
Variable

Net Exports (%
of GDP)

0.0008
[0.0011]

0.0007
[0.0007]

- 0.0007**
[0.0003]

- 0.0004
[0.0005]

- 0.0007**
[0.0004]

Log (TFP)

1.059***
[0.1812]

1.201***
[0.1097]

0.90997***
[0.0187]

0.9021***
[0.0393]

0.9085***
[0.044]

Log (Capital
Stock)

0.5049***
[0.1021]

0.4601***
[0.0229]

0.3661***
[0.0114]

0.37697***
[0.0249]

0.3713***
[0.0249]

Log(Population) 0.5192***
[0.14095]

0.566***
[0.0266]

0.67203***
[0.0876]

0.8541***
[0.0495]

0.6691***
[0.0813]

Total
Observations

237

239

239

239

239

R-Squared

0.9567

0.9652

0.9995

0.9390

0.9485

Prob (F0.000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
Statistic)
(*), (**), (***) represent 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance. Robust standard errors in brackets [ ].
The instrumental variable used in the Fixed effects IV regressions is Improved water Source (percent of
population with access)
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Preliminary Regression
. reg rgdp net_oda net_Exp rtfp rkstock pop
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

2.9595e+11
4.6470e+10

5
233

5.9191e+10
199442183

Total

3.4242e+11

238

1.4388e+09

rgdp

Coef.

net_oda
net_Exp
rtfp
rkstock
pop
_cons

-503.3378
2.259717
20967.31
.1031206
1892.539
-19997.76

Std. Err.

t

128.9794
52.0087
7186.75
.0199218
148.8858
8474.099

Number of obs
F(5, 233)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|

-3.90
0.04
2.92
5.18
12.71
-2.36

0.000
0.965
0.004
0.000
0.000
0.019

White’s Test for Heteroscedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(20)
Prob > chi2

=
=

217.75
0.0000

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test

Source

chi2

df

Heteroskedasticity
Skewness
Kurtosis

217.75
78.86
11.90

20
5
1

0.0000
0.0000
0.0006

Total

308.51

26

0.0000

Therefore there is evidence of heteroscedasticity.
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p

=
=
=
=
=
=

239
296.78
0.0000
0.8643
0.8614
14122

[95% Conf. Interval]
-757.4528
-100.2077
6807.996
.0638707
1599.205
-36693.41

-249.2229
104.7271
35126.63
.1423704
2185.874
-3302.11

Testing for Serial Correlation in Stata
predict u,
(1 missing
.
. gen lagu
(2 missing

resid
value generated)
= u[_n-1]
values generated)

. reg u lagu
Source

SS

df

MS

Model
Residual

4.0419e+10
5.9864e+09

1
235

4.0419e+10
25473856.1

Total

4.6406e+10

236

196634385

u

Coef.

lagu
_cons

.954532
154.4315

Std. Err.
.0239631
327.8851

t
39.83
0.47

Number of obs
F(1, 235)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

P>|t|
0.000
0.638

=
=
=
=
=
=

237
1586.70
0.0000
0.8710
0.8705
5047.2

[95% Conf. Interval]
.907322
-491.5383

1.001742
800.4013

The p value for the lagged coefficient of the error term is 0.000; therefore serial correlation is a
problem that needs to be corrected for.
Fisher Type Augmented Dickey Fuller Test for Unit Roots
Variable
rgdp
net_oda
net_Exp
rtfp
rkstock
pop

p-value
1.0000
0.0000
0.3268
0.9964
1.0000
0.0000

These results show that all the variables have unit roots except for net official development
assistance (net_oda) and population (pop) and therefore I can't rule out non-stationarity.
Furthermore, I ran regressions of each variable on a time variable, year, and I found that all the
variables were trending except for net exports.
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Is there a path for green growth? Evidence from India
Anh Trinh
Abstract
This paper uses historical temperature fluctuations in India to idenify its effects on
economic growth rates. Using a climate-adjusted form of the Solow growth model, I find that
one degree Celsius increase in temperature decreases GDP per capita growth by 0.71%. This
finding informs debates over the role of climate on economic development and suggests the
possibility of a green path for economic growth, a policy agenda that is both sustainable and
pro-growth.

I. Introduction
Climate change from greenhouse gas emission is infamously known as the “mother” of
all negative externality of the market, a problem that requires international corporation to
mitigate. While scientists are still debating the severity of this problem, in my opinion it is still
very hard to agree with the 45th President of the United States. Climate change is not a hoax
created by the Chinese government when 195 countries have already signed the Paris Agreement
in March to reduce temperature by 1.5° Celsius by cutting greenhouse gas emissions. The
potential repercussions of one country’s pulling out from an important agreement like this are
the motivation for my paper. Thus, the purpose of this paper is not to provide new insight on the
science of climate change, but only to use empirical data from India to establish that temperature
change negatively affect economic growth.
Often, when growth is taught in undergraduate neo-classical economics classes,
there are only three factors involved: technology, labor and capital represented in the
Solow growth model. At steady state, the only catalyst for economic growth according to
the Solow growth model is technology. In context of a developing country where
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agriculture contributes mainly to annual GDP growth - the measure of economic growth
in this paper – temperature change plays a role in economic growth. Technology may
increase crops productivity to a certain extent, but unusual heat and drought or
excessive precipitation and flooding affect the year’s agricultural outcomes almost
instantly, not to mention other non-economic consequences such as diseases and
conflicts (Hsiang, Burke & Miguel, 2013) . These non-economic outcomes have been
found to affect human capital and productivity, which is the catalyst for growth in the
Solow growth model (Zivin and Neidell, 2012 & 2013). In addition to agriculture,
industrial output might suffer when extreme weather affects resource productivity. If
the rate of temperature change is as significant as most environmental scientists
speculate, long term economic growth for a developing country like India will suffer.
Thus, for economists, a relationship between temperature anomaly and economic
growth contributes to the growing research on the economic consequences of “one of the
biggest market failure the world has seen” (Stern, 2007). The development of a growth
model that encompasses systematic changes like climate change will open new path to
more creative policies with even more potentials improve people’s lives especially in the
more vulnerable population of the world.
While there has been significant progress towards growth in the developing world, the
challenge of overcoming poverty and inequality will be greatly compounded by climate change
and environmental degradation, which disproportionately hurt the poor and most vulnerable.
These increasingly interlinked crises threaten development gains and prospects for continued
progress. While the Paris agreement is one commitment on paper to do more, the world’s
collective response has fallen far short of what is needed. Unmitigated warming is expected to
reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes roughly 23% by 2100 and
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widening global income inequality (Burket, Hsiang and Miguel, 2015). Thus, if adequately
examined, this research question poses an interesting policy outlook: if there is a relationshop
between economic growth and climate change, then any investment in a sustainable economy
will in turn have a positive feedback on the economy, open up opportunity for green growth. On
top of that, there are great potentials for delivering a “triple bottom line” of job–creating
economic growth coupled with environmental protection and social inclusion (World Resources
Institute, 2012). Developing countries might benefit greatly from an investment in sustainable
growth, both economically and environmentally. The economic benefits of a transition to a green
economy is a question that not only policymakers would want answers to, but also every sector
of the economy and are relevant to all investors and businesses. For investors, if there is
consensus on how climate change negatively affects the economy, investments in “socially
responsible” businesses are more attractive as these businesses are contributing more to the
economy’s growth than regular businesses. The benefits of being a sustainable business may
outweigh the costs, which incentivizes businesses to internalize their carbon emission. Decisions
made by private sector investors and financial institutions will have a major influence on how
society responds to climate change.
For many developing nations, current climate policies agenda means relying heavily on
financial and technical assistance from developed countries. Additionally, many developing
nations are not solely concerned about climate change, but also prioritize expanding energy
access to their peoples in order to move toward a better standard of living. One country that
faces this dichotomy is India, for its economic status, population challenge and energy issues. It
is the fourth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, accounting for 5.8 percent of global
emissions. India’s emissions increased by 67.1% between 1990 and 2012, and are projected to
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grow 85% by 20302.Yet, India faces a major energy issue: nearly 300 million people that
do not have access to even one electric light bulb3.This is even more challenging because
the mean rate of population growth in is 1.9% (Table 2), which is relatively high when
compared to developed nations4. How India balances expanding electricity access and economic
targets while at the same time achieving its climate targets will indeed be paramount to the future
of global climate change action. Thus, the answer to my research question is will provide a clear
picture to achieve the twofold challenge of green economic growth. Ebinger (2016), in the
Brookings policy brief even asserts that, “If India fails, Paris (Agreement) will fail”.
In the next section, I will describe what has been done in the literature surrounding
the relationship between economic growth and temperature change. In section III, I will
develop a regression model to answer my research question based on a climate-Solow
growth model. In section IV, I will discuss the data collected to test my hypothesis, and
in section V, I will use that data with my theory as evidence for my question. In section
VI, I will conclude.
II. Literature review
There is a large and growing literature that examines the causal effect of temperature change
on economic growth. It is not my objective to review all studies; rather, the goal is to review
those studies that have some connections to my research question. The literature suggest that
impact of climate change on GDP growth are found through two channels: climate direct impact
on aggregate output and pollution impact on human capital.
2

"India's Climate and Energy Policies." Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, October 2015.

3

Ebinger, Charles K. "India’s Energy and Climate Policy: Can India Meet the Challenge of
Industrialization and Climate Change?" The Brookings Institution, June 2012.
4

The World Factbook, Center Intelligence Agency.
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The first channel is found in studies that examine the level impact of climate change as an
equivalent of income gain or loss in percent of GDP. Frankhauser and Tol (2005) justifies their
hypothesis by arguing that the prospect of future damages (or benefits) of global warming affects
capital accumulation and people’s propensity to save, which in turn, affects output. In terms of
capital accumulation, with a constant saving rate, if climate change has a negative impact on
output, the amount of investment in an economy is reduced which lead to a lower GDP and
capital stock. Lower in investment can also slowdown technical progress and/or labor
productivity or human capital accumulation. The savings effect is when faced with uncertainty
posed by climate change: people change their behavior to save less and consume more today.
Both effects are found to be negative, and in an endogenous growth model, there is a different
rate of technical progress, thus enhances the savings and capital accumulation effects. The
authors examined the statistical approach in Mendelsohn’s work (Mendelsohn, Morrison,
Schlesinger, and Andronova, 2000; Mendelsohn, Schlesinger, and Williams, 2000). It is
based on direct estimates of the welfare impacts, using observed variations (across space
within a single country) in prices and expenditures to discern the effect of climate.
Mendelsohn assumes that the observed variation of economic activity with climate over
space holds over time as well; and uses climate models to estimate the future effect of
climate change. Mendelsohn’s estimates are done per sector for selected countries,
extrapolated to other countries, and then added up, but physical modeling is avoided.
Nordhaus (2006) and Maddison (2003) use versions of the statistical approach as well.
However, Nordhaus uses empirical estimates of the aggregate climate impact on income
across the world (per grid cell), while Maddison (2003) looks at patterns of aggregate
household consumption (per country). Like Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Maddison rely
exclusively on observations, assuming that “climate” is reflected in incomes and
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expenditures—and that the spatial pattern holds over time. Rehdanz and Maddison
(2005) also empirically estimate the aggregate impact, using self-reported happiness
measures from dozens of countries. The problem with these research is that, even
though they are able to establish and justify a clear linkage between climate and change
in the level of GDP, they did not employ a clear representation of climate within their
research models.
Other groups of researchers try to incorporate a clearer link between climate and
output into their analysis. Hsiang and Jina (2013) are the first to provide the first global
estimates of the effect of large-scale environmental disaster on long-run growth.
Through an extensive examination 6,700 tropical cyclones on the planet found that
national incomes decline, relative to their pre-disaster trend, and do not recover within
twenty years. Income losses arise from a small but persistent suppression of annual
growth rates spread across the fifteen years following disaster, generating large and
significant cumulative effects: a 90th percentile event reduces per capita incomes by
7.4% two decades later, effectively undoing 3.7 years of average development. This
finding substantially alters the costs global climate change, especially on developing
countries. However, these are only projections, based on a theoretical derivation under
the assumption that the frequencies of cyclones are certain. Similarly, Dell et al. (2012)
examine temperature shock and economic growth from panel data from 125 countries
from 1950 to 2005. The authors aggregate weather data to a country-year level from a
gridded monthly mean temperature and precipitation dataset at 0.5x0.5 degree
resolution. Economic data is the value-added agriculture and industrial as percentage of
GDP from the World Bank, World Development Indicators. Using various regression
models with lags, interaction between dummy variables such as poor and hot countries
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and political stability, Dell et al. (2012) find three main results. Poor countries, but not
wealthier ones, suffer from reduction in economics growth and growth rates because of
higher temperature. More specifically, a 1q Celsius increase in average temperature over
a given year will decrease economic growth by 1.3%. In addition, agricultural and
industrial output along with political stability decrease with increase in temperature.
These findings suggest that poorer countries are the ones suffer more from the negative
externality that is climate change. Hsiang (2010), using surface temperatures from
National Centers for Environmental Prediction and value added aggregate income by
industry data from the United Nations, shows similar findings using annual variation in
a sample of 28 Caribbean-basin countries over the 1970–2006 period. National output
falls 2.5 percent per 1°C temperature increase. This study further examines output
effects by time of year and shows that positive temperature shocks have negative effects
on income only when they occur during the hottest season. Low-income countries tend
to be in tropical zones closer to the equator. They are already hotter, and their output
already suffers to some extent from their higher temperatures in sectors like agriculture.
Moreover, low-income countries are typically less able to adapt to climate change both
because of a lack of resources and less capable institutions (Adger, 2006; Alberini,
Chiabai, and and Meuhlenbachs 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006; Tol, 2008; Tol and
Yohe, 2007b; Yohe and Tol, 2002). In the papers by Dell et al (2012) and Hsiang
(2010), the economic impact of climate change is assessed and valued separately – by
industry output as percentage of GDP. However, this method has potential issue: it may
ignore interlinkages between the sectors which could possibly affect overall growth data.
One criticism to the cross-sectional studies of temperature effect is that they are
driven by country specific characteristics – meaning that the models employed have
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omitted variables bias. However, Dell, Jones and Olken (2009) also examine the short
run effects using sub-national data from 12 countries in the Americas, and provide new
evidence that the negative cross-country relationship between temperature and income
also exists within countries and even within states. The fact that the cross-sectional
relationship holds within countries, as well as between countries, suggests that omitted
country characteristics are not wholly driving the cross-sectional relationship between
temperature and income. Nonetheless, a deficiency in the 2009 paper is the lack of
empirical estimates of long term GDP growth in relation to climate change. They only
attempt to reconcile the long run effect through two theoretical mechanisms:
convergence and adaptation. The theoretical model suggests that half of the negative
short-term effects of temperature may be offset in the long run through adaptation.
Thus, it is crucial to look at the empirical evidence from one country over time, to
account for the interlinkages cross sectors, and to find meaningful causal effect between
temperature and economic growth.
A second channel that climate and pollution can affect growth is through human
capital, measured by labor supply, productivity, and cognition. Zivin and Neidell (2011 &
2013) working papers published by the National Bureau of Economic Research find both
theoretical and empirical evidences of this channel. Zivin & Neidell (2013) provide a
theoretically linkage through the contemporaneous and latent effects of the
environment on human capital by doing a meta-analysis of multiple studies. Their
justification is that pollution may lead to direct brain development which affects
cognitive ability. Alternatively, decrements in lung functioning may affect one’s ability to
focus and thus perform a wide range of tasks. They categorize the impacts of pollution
into contemporaneous latent effects. The indicators of contemporaneous effect are
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schooling outcomes and labor market outcomes. Currie et al. (2009) use administrative
data from the 39 largest school districts in Texas to estimate schooling outcomes. When
carbon monoxide (CO) levels rise, absences also rise, 10 unit increase in CO2 decreases
test scores by 2.4% of a standard deviation. As for labor market outcomes, Hanna and
Oliva (2011) focus on the labor supply of workers in Mexico City and find that a 1
percent increase in sulfur dioxide levels decreases hours worked by 0.72 percent. In
addition, Clay et al. (2010) found that workers with higher levels of lead exposure, while
lead is still believed to be safe in the 20th century to make pipes, had substantially lower
wages, value added per worker and value of capital per worker.
The latent effects stem from the hypothesis that negative shocks early in life may
lead to a wide range of lasting effects, which may arise even without noticeable impacts
at the time of exposure (Almond and Currie, 2011). In 2011, Zivin and Neidell look at
the impacts of pollution on labor market outcomes. Labor market productivity of
agricultural workers is measured to examine the impact of ozone pollution on
productivity. Their data on daily worker productivity is derived from an electronic
payroll system used by a large farm in the Central Valley of California who pays their
employees through piece rate contracts (in which the employee is paid for each unit of
production at a fixed rate). Piece rates reduce shirking and increase productivity over
hourly wages and relative incentive schemes, particularly in agricultural settings. To
quantify for pollution, Zivin and Neidell used measures of environmental conditions
come from data on ozone levels from the system of monitoring networks maintained by
the California Air Resources Board. Ozone is not directly emitted but forms from
complex interactions between nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic chemicals
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(VOCs). They found that 10 parts per billion decrease in ozone concentrations increases
worker productivity by 4.2 percent.
Considering the theoretical and empirical evidences of the two channels that link
climate change and economic growth, this paper proposes to capture this dynamic effect
by using a different model to assess empirical data. I want to combine effect of
temperature and the effect of pollution on long run economic development, which has
not been done before. I use carbon emission as an indicator of pollution as informed by
Burke et al. (2015). They found that under business as usual emissions throughout the
21st century will decrease per capita GDP by 23% below what it would otherwise be.
Using data from India, I am able to capture the long run effects of temperature and
carbon emissions on one country’s GDP growth.
III. Modeling
To answer my research question: “Is there a negative effect of climate on economic
growth?” I use the simplified Solow-like growth model derived by Tsigaris and Wood
(2016) as a theoretical basis. To account for the effect of climate through the direct and
human capital channels discussed in section II, I consider environmental conditions as
an important factor of production into my model. First, consider a simple economy:
ܻ௧ ൌ  ܣ௧ ܮD௧ (1)
where Y is aggregate output, L measures population, A measures total factor
productivity. A damage function ܦ௧ ൌ  ݁ Tభ ்ா , where ܶ௧ is temperature anomaly in year t
from year t-1, ܧ௧ is the growth of carbon emission in year t from year t-1, and Tଵ is a
constant less than 0. The damage function is added to the output per worker CobbDouglas production function ݕ௧ ൌ  ܣ௧ ܮD௧ . The climate-Solow growth model is:
ܻ௧ ൌ  ܦ௧ ܣ௧ ܮD௧ (2.1)
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Ceteris paribus, output per worker is reduced with increased temperatures. Along the
balanced growth path, output per worker grows at a rate dependent on growth rates of
temperature and carbon emission, the growth rate of total factor productivity, gAt and
the growth rate of the capital labor ratio weighted by the income share of capital, α. In
addition to Tsigaris and Wood (2016)’s climate-Solow model, I followed Dell et al.’s
(2008) idea to incorporate climate growth’s effect on productivity growth:
݃௧ ൌ  ݃௧   Tଵ ܶ௧ ܧ௧ (2.2)
Equation (2.1) captures the level effect of climate on production. For example, the effect
of current temperature on output per capita. Equation (2.2) captures the growth effect
of climate; e.g. the effect of climate on features such as institutions that influence
productivity growth. The growth equation in (2.2) accounts for weather shocks while
allowing separate identification of level effects and growth effects. In particular, both
effects influence the growth rate in the initial period of a temperature. A temperature
shock may reduce agricultural yields, but once temperature returns to its average value,
agricultural yields bounce back. By contrast, the growth effect appears during the
climate shock and is not reversed: a failure to innovate in one period leaves the country
permanently further behind. Taking the logs of equation (2.1):
݃௧ ൌ Tଵ ሺܶ௧  ܧ௧ ሻ  ݃௧  D݃௧ (3)
The growth effect is identified in (3) as the summation of the climate effects over time.
To estimate the effects of temperature and carbon emission on economic growth, I run
regression of the form:
݃௧ ൌ Dଵ ܶ௧   Dଶ ܧ௧   Dସ ݃௧   H

(4)

where Dଵ ǡ Dଶ ǡ Dଷ ǡ Dସ are estimates of the effects on GDP per capita growth of the
growth rate of temperature, CO2 emission and population, respectively. From this
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regression model, I hypothesize that the temperature and carbon emission growth rates
(the difference between the natural log of temperature and emission from year t-1 and
year t) negatively affect economic growth.
IV. Data
In an exhaustive review of literature on this topic, Dell et al. (2014) found that
most often used in climate-economics literature are gridded datasets, which a balanced
panel of weather data for every point on a grid. The most frequently used gridded
datasets in the studies reviewed here are the global temperature and precipitation data
produced by the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia with
spatial resolution of 0.5x0.5. In this paper, I chose to use the World Bank group’s data
set for three independent variables from year 1972 to 2012 to maintain the consistency
of all observations. Given the complexity of data manipulation and problem with
accessibility of the ideal datasets from the University of East Anglia, I averaged out
monthly temperature data from the World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal to
get annual temperature data and then find the difference between the natural log of the
temperature from year to year to get temperature growth rate. I manipulated similarly
CO2 emissions as metric tons per capita data from the World Bank. I used Indian
annual real GDP per capita and population growth rates data from the OECD dataset
(OECD, 2016).
The descriptive statistics from Table 1. suggest that India’s growth rates of
temperature change, CO2 and GDP per capita fluctuate wildly. The variation of the
growth rate of GDP per capita is the most notable, from a decrease of 7.4 percent to an
increase of 8.7 percent. This variation is C02 emission decreases by 2.4 metric tons per
capita in one year and increase 4.3 metric tons per capita in another. Climate literature
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suggests that the average global temperature on Earth has increased by about 0.8°
Celsius (1.4° Fahrenheit) since 1880 (NASA Earth Observatory, 2010). However, the
mean annual temperature from 1972 to 2012 decreases by 0.001° Celsius. Its minimum
and maximum values nonetheless suggest that temperature fluctuates from decreasing
0.7 degree Celsius to increasing almost 1° Celsius. The data indicate that the growth
effects certainly cannot be ignored in order to answer this research question.
V. Evidence
I estimate the dependent variable which is annual growth of GDP per capita on the
following independent variables: growth rates of temperature, CO2 and population. Since my
empirical model uses ordinary least squares estimates on time series data, it suffers from GaussMarkov assumptions. Table 3 in section VI. Appendix summarizes the tests used and results to
evaluate the violation of these assumptions. First, the Ramsey’s test was used to test for omitted
variables bias, which determines whether there are neglected nonlinearities in the model. The pvalue for this test is less than 5% for my model, meaning that the correct functional form to
estimate the independent variable the model was used. Second, time series data are often subject
to the correlation its past and future values. Nonetheless, my model passes the Durbin-Watson
test for autocorrelation for time series data, with a test statistics equals to 2.29. To test for
multicollinearity to make sure two or more predictor variables in a multiple regression model are
not highly correlated, I used the variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF statistics (Table 3) for
all three of my independent variables show that the variance of the estimated regression
coefficients are not inflated (values are close to 1) as compared to when the predictor variables
are not linearly related. The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity tests the null hypothesis
that the variance of the error is the same for all individuals. My model did not pass the because
my p-value is slightly higher than 0.05. This means that the variance around the regression line is
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not the same for all values of the predictor variables. The violation of homoscedasticity can be
fixed using a robust standard error, based on the covariance matrix estimates which are
consistent in the presence of arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity. I used the ‘,robust’ command
on STATA after my original regression command to fix the problem.
After fixing for heteroscedasticity with robust standard errors estimates, I am able to
obtain the best linear unbiased estimators. According to my regression results (Table 2), the
coefficient on temperature is positive and statistically significant. I find that the temperature
change significantly affect growth rates of GDP per capita at the 5% significance level. Holding
other independent variables constant, one degree Celsius increase in temperature decrease GDP
per capita growth by 0.71%. In addition, population growth significantly affect GDP per capita
growth at the 1% level, with a one percentage point increase in population growth decreases
GDP per capita growth by 4.4%. Given the average 1.9% current growth rate of population
(Table 1), the Indian economy has to growth at approximately 8.7% to make up for its population
growth. Yet, in 2015 the economy is only growing at a rate of 7.57% (World Bank). The
economic growth and climate dichotomy is apparent in India.
VI. Conclusion
I find one degree Celsius increase in temperature decrease GDP per capita growth by 0.71%
and 1% increase in population growth decrease growth by 4.4%. My techniques could have
affected my results in several ways. First, I only used data from India with only 42 observations
from 1971 to 2012. I averaged the mean annual temperature from monthly data to match the
GDP per capita and the CO2 emission annual data. The results could have been improved I could
find quarterly data for all independent variables. Moreover, the weather data set used in this
paper is not ideal. A gridded spatial weather data might improve the accuracy of weather results.
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Second, I employed a very simple version of the Solow growth model to estimate my data. As
suggested in Frankhauser and Tol (2005), the Solow model’s emphasis on physical capital
accumulation makes it less sensitive to climate change. The authors suggested using the
Mankiw-Romer-Weil and Romer models for future research, which emphasize human capital
and knowledge accumulation, respectively, as they are more sensitive to climate change. A more
elaborate endogenous growth model might improve the results of this paper. Third, the model
used in this paper and other papers in the literature review section only examined this hypothesis
in a closed economy. Globalization may exacerbate the negative impact in one place and
alleviate the positive benefits in another because climate change would affect the supply of
capital as well as the relative rates of return on investment (Frankhauser & Tol, 2005). Finally,
the objective of answering this research question is to figure out policy recommendations and/or
ways to internalize this problem to best improve social welfare. The goal of the growth model
chosen is to maximize aggregate social welfare. However, there are ethical concerns with this
approach to welfare, especially when it comes to climate policy (Sen, 1979).
It is important to note that, the negative relationship between growth and temperature change
found in this paper implies a challenge in the reality of the Indian economy. Policymakers in
India realize this challenge, and have been implementing significant actions. India has taken
steps on renewable energy with increasing installed capacity5. The renewable energy goals
require continued effort, strong implementation, and improved utilization of capacity, but there
are favorable signs. In 2008, India launched its NAPCC, featuring eight national missions,
ranging from R&D to sustainable agriculture, with centerpiece programs to scale up solar power

5

Central Electricity Authority, “Executive Summary: Power Sector,” January 2014,
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and energy efficiency6. With respect to renewable energy, there are great opportunities for India
and its international partners. In an Ernst & Young report, in emerging markets “renewable
energy potential is attracting high levels of foreign investment, generating new jobs and creating
local supply chains.... For investors, renewable energy assets are generating robust
returns.” 7Thirdly, with challenges come opportunities, especially for government-government
cooperation, public-private partnerships and so on. There are endless opportunities if everyone
works together to combat this issue.
The solution for this negative externality is not as simple as simply creating a
carbon tax, cap-and-trade, or use property rights, as most economics models typically
show. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of a green economy show great
potential for delivering a “triple bottom line” of job–creating economic growth coupled
with environmental protection and social inclusion. Admittedly, there are obstacles to
realize this potential on a multinational level and in practice. Building a green economy
that is not only sustainable but also equitable requires carefully designed policies and
investments towards developing countries to benefit from this transition. As suggested
by a report by the World Resources Institute report (2012), of particular importance is
the need for governance and policy reforms that extend to poor people secure rights
over the environmental assets that underpin their livelihoods and well-being, and that
ensure a greater voice in decisions affecting how these assets are managed. At the same
time, policies and measures such as green protectionism and aid conditionality that

6

Neha Pahula et al., “GHG Mitigation in India: An Overview of the Current Policy Landscape,” World
Resources Institute (WRI), WRI Working Paper, March 2014,
7

“Renewable Energy Country Attractiveness Index (RECAI),” EY, February 2014.
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could adversely impact low and middle-income countries and people living in poverty
must be avoided if the benefits of an inclusive green economy are to be realized.
While my paper show the benefits of having a sustainable economic growth agenda, future
research might examine the costs of a green path for grow to actually suggest practical policies
for countries in this climate-conscious world. Another interesting question could be to use
econometrics techniques to predict the rate of output growth under the predicted rate of
temperature growth and constant carbon emission. Moreover, in this paper I only examined the
two channels of climate change on economic development. However, there are more indirect and
interdisciplinary channels that temperature can affect long-term economic development. For
example, Hsiang, Burke and Miguel (2013) conducted a meta-analysis of studies on the link
between climate variability and conflicts from disciplines such as psychology, political science
and economics, and found that increase from normal rainfall and temperature increase the
intergroup violence by 4% and interpersonal violence by 14%. A country under conflicts is very
likely to not involve in meaningful economic activities that contribute to growth. Future
research can look at this intersection between disciplines to even further quantify the effects of
global warming and economic growth.
In the grand scheme of things, understanding the problem of global warming is
crucial in today’s interrelated world because this is a problem that carries across
disciplines, nations, and generations.
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VII. Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Temp change
CO2 Growth (%)
Population Growth (%)
GDP Growth (%)

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

-.001
1.593
1.918
3.704

.344
1.275
.375
3.004

-.704
-2.413
1.27
-7.383

.989
4.311
2.361
8.755

Table 2. Regression Results
Dependent variable: GDP per capita annual growth (in %)
Intercept
12.207
(1.810)
Temp change
-.705
(.263)*
CO2growth
-.003
(0.172)
Population growth
-4.391
1.087**
R-squared
0.358
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*significant at 5%, **significant at 1%
Table 3. Tests for Gauss-Markov assumptions
Assumption

Test Used

Test Statistics

Omitted variables

Ramsey

0.41

Heteroscedasticity

Breusch-Pagan

Autocorrelation

Durbin-Watson

Multicollinearity

Rejection Rule
p-value = 0.74 >
0.05

Results

7.68

p-value = 0.0056
> 0.005

Did not
pass

2.29

dL = 1.098
dU = 1.518
(4-d) > dU

Passed

< 10

Passed

Population:
1.05
Variance Inflation
C02: 1.05
Factors
Temp: 1.03
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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of specific airline business decisions on aircraft
accident propensity. Airline safety affects everyone and has large regulatory and policy
implications. Existing research has focused largely on three areas: airline financial health, safety
and the resulting effects of accidents. I use both Poisson and Negative Binomial models to study
two different airline features: low-cost carriers and flight length, and how they relate to the
probability of an aircraft accident. Based on results using a Generalized Negative Binomial
model, I find statistically significant evidence at the 99% confidence level that a 1-unit increase
in the flight length leads to a 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents. I also find statistically
significant evidence at the 99% confidence level that when an airline is classified as a low-cost
carrier, the number of accidents decreases by 79.16%. These results indicate that a homogenous
safety regulation framework is not appropriate for the airline industry with regard to flight length
and cost structure.
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I.

Introduction
This paper investigates the following two questions: Do budget or low-cost airlines have

more aircraft accidents than their counterparts of legacy carriers? Do airlines that provide longer
average flight routes have more airplane accidents than their counterparts?
Intuitively, it may be expected that budget airlines only take the minimum safety
precautions in order to provide the same services as their counterparts for a lower cost. Thus, an
airline classified as a budget airline may have more accidents than a non-budget airline as a
result of less investment in safety. Alternately, budget airlines may spend more on safety in order
to preserve their reputation and thus experience fewer accidents than their counterparts. A longer
flight length may cause an increase in the number of accidents because the more time an aircraft
is in the air, the more time there is for an accident to occur. Conversely, if the probability of an
accident occurring is greatest during taxiing, takeoff and landing, operators who service shorthaul flights may experience more accidents as they rely on quick turnaround times and incur a
larger number of takeoffs and landings.
Existing research relating to these topics focuses on the subsequent effects of airplane
accidents, the effect of an airline company’s financial health on safety and the ways in which
airlines make business decisions. The Poisson model for discrete independent variables is used
consistently throughout the research related to accident rates. Using this model, existing research
has found contradicting evidence on the statistical significance between financial health and
safety (Wang, Hofer and Dresner, 2013; Rose, 1990; Golbe, 1986).
This paper closes the gap in existing research between business decisions and safety as I
investigate the effect of business decisions, specifically whether or not the airline is a budget
airline and flight routes, on accident rates. I make use of count models, specifically Poisson and
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Negative Binomial, to answer my questions of interest because my dependent variable, number
of accidents, is a positive count variable. While there is an abundant amount of existing research
which uses the Poisson model and number of accidents as a dependent variable, no other
research has combined these things with independent variables which relate specifically to
deliberate business decisions such as flight length and whether or not an airline is a budget
airline. Applying the Generalized Negative Binomial model closes a gap in existing research
while also generalizing my conclusions by eliminating the assumption that the variance of my
dependent variable is linear and equal to the mean.
This topic is important because it relates to issues of safety, transportation routes and
business efficiency. Understanding the connection between a firm’s decision making incentives
and the frequency of accidents can help to prevent airplane accidents in the future through more
effective regulation and improved business efficiency. Airlines adapt to changing economic
environments while continuously aiming to maximize profits. Recognizing these decisions in
relation to accident frequency may help businesses to understand the results of their actions and
thus, change them accordingly to increase safety.
These research questions address issues of public policy and customer awareness, both
nationally and internationally. The potential risks associated with flying are large and affect
many more individuals than just those who fly. It is important for both consumers and the public
to recognize the risks associated with flying, particularly if the risk is not uniform across airlines
or flight routes. The results might help to determine if a universal regulatory framework for all
types of airlines is the best form of safety-related policy.
The paper is organized as follows: In section II, I review related literature, important
variables and common models used to answer similar questions. In section III, I outline the
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Poisson and Negative Binomial models, my hypotheses and describe my research method. In
section IV, I discuss the data and define each variable. In section V, I present the empirical
results of my research. In section VI, I conclude my analysis with the implications and
applicability of my results.

II.

Literature Review
Existing research related to the effects of airline business decisions on aircraft accidents

falls into two categories. A first line of this research focuses on safety as it relates to profits,
financial health, investment and demand. A second line of this research studies business
decisions as they relate to both topics of low cost competition and flight routes. My research
provides a link between the existing yet isolated research on business decisions and safety.
First I discuss existing research relating to safety, and accidents in particular. A useful
study is conducted by Golbe (1986), who examines the relationship between profits and safety
precautions taken by an individual airline. She implements both cross-sectional and time-series
techniques on data of U.S. airlines aggregated at the industry level from 1952 – 1972. Golbe
(1986) emphasizes key variables of number of departures, load factors and net income, as a
measure of profitability. Golbe (1986) uses airline accident experience as a measure of safety
and models both accident experience and net income as dependent variables. Her research
concludes that there is no significant relationship between profits and safety (Golbe 1986).
Bornstein and Zimmerman (1988) investigate the effect of an aircraft accident on flight
demand using time series data for U.S. air carriers from 1960 - 1985, modeling revenue per
passenger as a function of elapsed time since an accident, seasonal dummies, and firm and time
fixed effects. They conclude that although an accident results in a significant $4.5 million loss
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for a firm, there is not a significant relationship between accidents and flight demand before
deregulation of the industry and only weak evidence of an effect on demand after deregulation
(Bornstein and Zimmerman 1988).
Rose (1990) studies the effect of an airlines’ financial health on accident rates using panel
data across thirty-five U.S. airlines from 1957 - 1986. She measures safety as a risk distribution,
gathering data on both safety investment and physical conditions in which firms operate their
aircraft. Similar to Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013), Rose (1990) uses the Poisson probability
distribution to model the dependent variable of accident rate. Using fixed effects, Rose (1990)
separately models both total accidents and fatal accidents as an effect of departures (system
departures in thousands), average stage length (thousands of miles), carrier type, foreign flights,
size of firm, airline operating experience (billions of miles) and time variant characteristics of
technology. While I use some of the same variables, all of my models use only total accidents as
the dependent variable. She concludes that an increase in operator profit leads to a statistically
significant decrease in accident rates (Rose 1990).
Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) measure the effect of safety investment on accident
propensity and financial health. They use panel data on airlines from the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) from 1991 – 2008. Due
to the entry and exit of airlines within the industry, they treat their panel dataset as unbalance.
These authors model Poisson functions of number of accidents as I will do in this paper. Further,
they create a variable for average accidents per departure, substituting this as the dependent
variable in their reduced form model. They conclude that safety investment reduces accident
propensity and find no relationship between financial condition and accident propensity nor
financial condition and safety investment (Wang, Hofer and Dresner 2013).
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Other pertinent research emphasizes airline business decisions in relation to budget
airlines and flight routes. Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) examine the relationship between lowcost operator presence at airports and average airfare. They use the DOT’s form 41 for Air
Carrier Traffic Statistics to crease a time-series data consisting of the four quarters of 1996. They
use a cross section regression model in which the dependent variable is average yield
(price/distance) with independent variables including total passengers, distances (stage length)
and ValueJet. They measure ValueJet as a binary variable valued at 1 if the airline ValueJet
services a particular airport and 0 otherwise; this variable accounts for the presence of low cost
carriers at any given airport. Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) conclude that the presence of lowcost competition for a particular route has a statistically significant negative effect on revenue.
Garrow, Holte and Mumbower (2012) study the phenomenon of product de-bundling as it
relates to the emergence of low-cost carriers. They collect airline data from individual airline
websites regarding baggage fees, cancelation fees, seat fees and ticket change fees. They find
statistically significant evidence that low-cost carriers are the most likely carriers to charge
additional fees.
Gillen and Hazledine (2015) study the effect of regional route fluctuations on firm
pricing strategy. They use data from a total of six regions on various flight routes and use the
Hirschman-Herfindahl index to account for airline concentration. They find no significant
relationship between supply of seats and route length but find a significant difference in airfares
across regions (Gillen and Hazledine 2015).
The limitation of prior research addressed in this paper is the lack of research examining
the cause of accidents as related to business decisions. Although there is abundant research on
airline safety and business decisions relating to budget airlines and flight routes, these topics
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have only been studied in isolation from each other. Current research focuses on the effects of
accidents but little has been examined regarding the cause of the accidents. My research utilizes
many of the same variables, models and tests as those introduced above but I investigate the link
between these industry characteristics and accidents to determine the effect of both flight length
and budget airlines on accidents.

III.

Model and Methodology
I test whether budget airlines have more accidents than their counterparts and whether an

increase in flight length leads to an increase in the number of aircraft accidents using a unified
model. I hypothesize that budget airlines have more accidents than their counterparts as budget
airlines may cut safety costs in order to provide cheaper fares than legacy or non-budget airlines.
I expect an increase in flight length to cause a decrease in the number of accidents as I suspect
that operators who provide long-haul flights invest more in safety and experience fewer takeoffs
and landings, which are most damaging to the engines and aircraft, than operators who provide
more frequent short-haul services.
I use a unified Negative Binomial model to answer my two questions of interest because
of the similarity in potential control variables. I have included control variables which intuitively
affect aircraft accidents without being directly related to flight length or whether or not an airline
is a budget airline.
Similar to previous research such as that of Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) and Rose
(1990), I begin by using the Poisson model to estimate the relationship between flight distance,
budget airlines and accidents. The Poisson model is applicable to this data set because the
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dependent variable, aircraft accidents, is a count variable. This model requires the dependent
variable to be a discrete, non-negative value including zero, which is true of aircraft accidents.
As the number of accidents may equal zero for any given year, we cannot take the log of
the dependent variable. Instead, I use the following exponential function:
E(y|x1, x2, …, xk) = exp(ߚ 0 + ߚ 1x1 + … + ߚ kxk) =

(1)

exp(Xitߚ)
Where xit represents various independent or control variables for airline i at time t while ߚ
represents corresponding estimated coefficients. However, with the Poisson model, equation 1
can be simplified because the distribution is determined by the mean; in fact, the mean and
variance of Y are equal in the Poisson model. This is represented in the following equation:
P(Yit) = (exp[-exp(xitߚ)][ሺݔ௧ ߚሻ ] / Y!

(2)

Where P(Yit) is the probability of Y accidents for airline i at time t, exp(xitߚ) is the expected
number of accidents for airline i at time t or the average accident rate per departure and Y = 0, 1,
2, …, exp(xitߚ) > 0.
Further, in the Poisson model, the mean and the variance are equal. This is represented in
the following equation:
E(Yit) = exp(xitߚ) = Var(Yit)

(3)

However due to the nature of accident rates, there may be more or less variation in the
data than expected under Poisson. Thus, the Negative Binomial model may provide a better fit
for the relationship of interest as the Poisson model may produce biased coefficient estimates in
the presence of over- or under-dispersion (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995).8 As shown

8

As stated by Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995), “It is well known, based on the finding
of many previous research efforts, that accident frequency data tend to be over-dispersed, with
the variance being significantly greater than the mean” (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995).
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by Shankar, Mannering and Barfield (1995), who study the effect of roadway accidents using the
Negative Binomial model, equation 3 can be altered to represent the relationship with a Negative
Binomial model in the following way:
Var(Yit) = E(Yit)[1+ ߙE(Yit)]

(4)

From the above equation, the variance is no longer equal to the mean when using the
Negative Binomial model due to the existence of the term [1 + ߙE(Y)], when ߙE(Y) ≠ 0. When
ߙ is equal to 0, Var(Y) = E(Y) and I am left with variance which is represented in the Poisson
model. However, when ߙ is not equal to zero, there is evidence of either over - or underdispersion. It is important to note that the Negative Binomial model is only applicable in the
presence of over-dispersion using the Poisson distribution, in which the variance is greater than
the mean; when there is under-dispersion using the Poisson distribution, the Negative Binomial
model is not valid (Shankar, Mannering and Barfield, 1995). As used by Shankar, Mannering
and Barfield (1995), the following equation represents the probability distribution using the
Negative Binomial model:
P(Yit) =

ሺఏାଢ଼౪ ሻ
ሺఏሻଢ଼౪ Ǩ

(୧୲ ఏ )(Yit)(1 - uit)

(5)

Where uit = ߠ/(ߠ + exp(xitߚ)), ߠ = 1/ߙ and Ȟሺሻ represents a function of gamma (Shankar,
Mannering and Barfield, 1995).
I will also implement the Generalized Negative Binomial model in which the form of the
variance is not assumed to be linear, as it is in the Negative Binomial model. Thus, the
Generalized Negative Binomial model makes my results more precise as the form of the variance
is not assumed to be linear.
In my regression, I specify the following model:
E(Accidentsit) = Departuresit * exp(Ⱦ0 + Ⱦ1Budget Airlineit + Ⱦ2Average Stage
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(6)

Lengthit + uit)
Consistent with existing research, the expected number of accidents is the number of
departures multiplied by the average accident rate per departure because of the stochastic or
random nature of accident data (Wang, Hofer and Dresner, 2013; Rose, 1990).
Based on equation 6, my hypothesis that budget airlines are less safe is supported when
ߚ 1 > 0. When an airline is considered to be a budget airline and ߚ 1 is positive, there is a positive
effect on the expected value of accidents and thus my hypothesis is supported. My hypothesis
that an increase in average flight length leads to a decrease in accidents is supported when ߚ 2 <
0, as an increase in the average stage length should be negatively related to the number of
accidents, according to my prediction.

IV.

Data
I use data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) and the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) as has been used in
previous research. To minimize measurement errors, I make use of a consolidated data set from
the Airline Data Project at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) which contains data
from the BTS form 41 which gathers quarterly billing data and monthly airline data. Using these
data sources, I construct a panel data set which varies across fifteen U.S. airlines over twenty-one
years, from 1995 through 2015. Data on all fifteen airlines in the MIT project is included; a list
of these airlines along with the years for which data is available for each airline can be found in
table 1 of section VIII.
Due to mergers and acquisitions within the industry, there is no data for all twenty-one
years for all fifteen airlines. It is important to note that while this is considered “missing data” in
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terms of the raw data, the data is not in fact missing as the airlines simply were not in existence
or operating during the years in which I do not have data. I have verified with individual airline
websites that the years in which there is “missing data” align with mergers, acquisitions, entries
or closings within the industry. Because of these gaps in the data, together with the fact that my
panel is relatively narrow in the sense that I only include data on fifteen airlines, I continue my
analysis by treating my panel data set as cross sectional data as done by Golbe (1986).9
I use a dependent variable of aircraft accidents as used by Golbe (1986) Borenstein and
Zimmerman (1988), and Rose (1990) and Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013). I have gathered the
information from the FAA which has the NTSB’s Accident and Incident Database. According to
the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), an aircraft accident is
defined as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have
disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft
receives substantial damage” (ASIAS). I have included all U.S. aircraft accidents, including fatal
and non-fatal, from January 1995 through December 2015 for all fifteen airlines used in my
dataset. Due to the nature of aircraft accidents, this variable is a non-continuous, discrete count
variable.
In order to answer my question regarding the effect of flight length on accident
propensity, my primary independent variable of interest is average stage length which is used by
Golbe (1986), Rose (1990) and Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2012). This variable is available in the
consolidated MIT study, which pulls data from the BTS form 41, and measures the total number
9
I report results using fixed effects in tables 9 and 10 of section VIII. While the signs of the
average stage length and budget airline variable coefficients are the same when implementing
cross sectional data methods, neither coefficient is statistically significant at even the 10%
significance level.
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of miles flown divided by the total number of departures. Thus, the average stage length
represents average flight length of each departure, measured in miles.
In order to answer my question regarding the effect of being a budget airline on accident
propensity, I have investigated three potential independent variables including a dummy
variable, total baggage fee and total cancelation fee. Based on the research of Garrow, Holte and
Mumbower (2011), who study the phenomena of product de-bundling in the airline industry, I
have created a binary variable valued at 1, which is attributed to a budget or low-cost carrier and
0, which is attributed to a non-budget or legacy airline. Their research includes a total of eleven
U.S. airlines, ten of which I also include in my data set. Although Garrow, Holte and Mumbower
(2011) do not precisely define budget or legacy carriers, they state that the legacy carriers
“participate in well-established alliances that enable them to further increase the number of
destinations they can serve; these major carriers also tend to have a moderate number of other
airline partners that further enhance their networks” (Garrow, Holte and Mumbower, 2011).
Based on their classification of low cost carriers, I identify the following same four budget
airlines: Southwest, AirTran, JetBlue and Frontier.10 I classify the remaining eleven airlines in
my data set as legacy or non-budget airlines, six of which are also considered to be legacy
carriers by Garrow, Holte and Mumbower (2011). Thus, I assume that the five airlines included
in my data set, but not included in the specific reference literature, are also legacy carriers.
I have also included total baggage fees and total cancelation fees as potential key
independent variables to account for budget airlines. I have gathered both fee variables from the
consolidated MIT study, both of which are measured in thousands of U.S. dollars. I use the
10
In conducting further company research, I find both Allegiant Air and Sprit to be considered
budget airlines. While I do not include these classifications in my primary results, tables 11 and
12 in section VIII show the results of my research with additionally categorizing both Allegiant
Air and Spirt as budget airlines.
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conclusion of Garrow, Holte and Mumbower’s (2011) research that budget airlines are the most
likely to charge additional ancillary fees. Thus, I use the fee variables, interchangeably, as proxy
variables to represent an airline behaving “more like a budget airline.” I assume that a 1-unit
increase in either fee variable indicates an airline behaving more like a budget airline. However,
due to structural breaks and variation across low-cost carriers, as mentioned by Garrow, Holte
and Mumbower (2011), there is potential bias in the way these fee variables may represent
budget airlines. Due to the difficulty in defining a budget airline precisely, as shown in previous
research, I include all three variables (baggage fee, cancelation fee, budget airline) to
interchangeably account for budget airlines.
I use the number of incidents reported for each airline in each year, from the FAA ASIAS
as done by Rose (1990). An incident is defined as “an occurrence other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of
operations” (ASIAS). Due to the nature of aircraft incidents, this variable is a non-continuous,
discrete count variable. As I have not been able to include the average age of the aircraft, I
presume that incidents will work to control for age of aircraft-related characteristics, which may
affect accidents as an increase in incidents intuitively leads to an increase in the probability of an
accident.
The following control variables that I mention are all gathered from the MIT project and
thus the BTS form 41. I control for size of aircraft by dividing average seat miles (ASM) by the
total number of miles flown. ASM is an industry standard measurement of utilization and airline
output and measures the total number of available seats per departure multiplied by the total
number of miles traveled. However, because ASM includes mileage, there is potential for
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collinearity with my independent variable of interest, average stage length. Thus, I divide ASM
by miles and am left with the average number of seats per departure.
I control for airline size by including the number of functioning aircraft and total
operating revenue measured in billions of U.S. dollars. I include the average salary of both pilots
and co-pilots, measured in U.S. dollars, to control for pilot experience and skill level. I include
maintenance per aircraft in which I divide the total maintenance expenditure, measured in
thousands of U.S. dollars, by the total number of aircraft in the fleet to account for maintenance
cost per aircraft. Summary statistics of all variables can be found in table 2 of section VIII.
While I attempt to create a robust data set including industry standard, intuitively sound
and previously used variables, I have not been able to collect data on average aircraft age and
airline profitability. Aircraft incidents may serve as a proxy variable for aircraft age while total
revenue may serve as a proxy variable for profitability, although neither fully capture the effect
of the absent variables.
V.

Results
I present my basic Poisson regressions in table 3 of section VIII. In running the most

simplified regression presented in column 1, the sign of the coefficient of interest in positive and
statistically significant at the 99% level. When I include control variables to the same model, as
seen in columns 2 and 3 of table 3, the estimated coefficient of the average stage length variable
becomes negative while remaining statistically significant. The results in column 1 indicate that a
1-unit increase in flight length leads to a 0.059% increase in the number of accidents while the
results in columns 2 and 3 indicate that a 1-unit increase in average stage length leads to a 0.10%
decrease in the number of accidents, which are all statistically significant at the 99% confidence
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level. Further, seen in the regressions in columns 2 and 3 of table 3, when an airline is a budget
airline the number of accidents decreases by 61.74% and 61.41%, respectively.11
Based on the regression represented in column 3 of table 3 in section VIII, I run both
Deviance and Pearson goodness-of-fit tests. With P-values of 0.0017 and 0.0005, respectively, I
reject the null hypothesis that the Poisson model fits my relationship of interest well.
The regressions in table 5 utilize the Negative Binomial model. The basic regression in
column 1 indicates that a 1-unit increase in the average flight length leads to a 0.07% increase in
the number of accidents which is statistically significant at the 5% significance level. This
positive sign of the coefficient is similar to that of the basic regression using the Poisson model
shown in column 1 of table 3. When I implement the Negative Binomial model and run the LR
test of alpha = 0, I get a P-value of 0.000. Thus, I reject the null hypothesis that alpha is equal to
zero and conclude the Negative Binomial model to be a good fit for my data as I find overdispersion and cannot assume the variance of accidents to be equal to the mean or for alpha to be
equal to 0.12
When I include control variables to the basic Negative Binomial model, as seen in
columns 2-5 of table 5, the estimated coefficient of the average stage length variable becomes
negative. The difference between the regressions represented in columns 2-4 is the variable in
which I use to account for budget airline. In column 2 of table 5, I include the baggage fee
variable while in column 3 of table 5, I include the cancelation fee variable. Intuitively I expect
an increase in baggage or cancelation fees to lead to an increase in the number of accidents, as I
assume that airlines that charge higher fees behave more similarly to budget airlines. From the
11
The output in table 4 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Poisson regressions represented in table 3.
12
Further, because the mean of accidents is 1.28 while the variance is 3.43, I can simply identify
the presence of over-dispersion within my data.
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regression output seen in columns 2 and 3, neither estimated coefficient of the baggage nor
cancelation fee variable is statistically significant at even the 90% confidence level. Due to the
insignificance of the estimated coefficients, structural breaks and potential measurement error, I
conclude that neither baggage nor cancelation fees accurately represent budget airlines.13
The regressions represented in columns 4 and 5 of table 5 include a binary budget airline
variable as opposed to a fee variable to account for budget airlines. Both regressions show that a
1-unit increase in the average stage length leads to 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents,
which is statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The estimated coefficients of the
budget airline variable are large in magnitude and statistically significant at the 99% level; I find
that when an airline is a budget airline, the number of accidents decreases by 71.84% and
79.16%. It is worth noting the changes in significance of the estimated coefficients of the
average stage length, maintenance per aircraft, number of seats and incidents variables from
column 3 to column 4.14 The large magnitude of the budget airline coefficients in columns 4 and
5 may be explained by the measurement error in the variable and thus I am not confident in these
conclusions drawn to answer my question regarding the effect of budget airlines on accident
propensity.
The regressions represented in table 7 are the same as those presented in table 5, although
they implement the Generalized Negative Binomial model as opposed to the Negative Binomial
model. The results are almost identical to those of the Negative Binomial model but because the
generalized model even further loosens the assumptions of the variance structure, I have decided
13
The output in table 6 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Negative Binomial regressions represented in table 5.
14
In line with previous literature, I also run these regressions with an added time trend variable
in order to account for advances in technology over time which may decrease accident
propensity. However, because the estimated coefficient of the time trend variable is consistently
statistically insignificant, I do not include it in my final results.
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to treat the regression in column 5 of table 7 as my final regression. As some of the estimated
coefficients in the regression represented in column 4 of table 7 are not statistically significant at
even the 90% confidence level, I run the regression in column 5 of table 7 in order to more
accurately estimate the coefficients of interest.
From the regression output represented in column 5 of table 7, I have statistically
significant evidence at the 1% significance level that a 1-unit increase in average stage length
leads to a 0.11% decrease in the number of accidents while I have statistically significant
evidence at the 1% significance level that when an airline is classified as being a budget airline,
the number of accidents decreases by 79.16%. All of the signs of the estimated coefficients align
with intuition.15
The negative and statistically significant coefficient of the average stage length variable
does not align with the research of Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) nor Rose (1990), who both
find statistically significant positive coefficient estimates.16 However, the negative sign of the
average stage length coefficient does align with the findings of Golbe (1986) though she does not
find the negative average stage length coefficients to be statistically significant at any level.

VI.

Conclusion
From the previous section, I conclude that there is statistically significant evidence at the

1% significance level that a 1-unit increase in average stage length leads to a 0.11% decrease in
15
The output in table 8 of section VIII represents the marginal effect interpretations associated
with the Negative Binomial regressions represented in table 7. Column 5 of table 8 in section
VIII represents the marginal effects corresponding to my final regression in which a 1-unit
increase in average flight length is associated with 0.00093 fewer accidents and an airline being a
budget carrier is associated with 0.57 fewer accidents.
16
Wang, Hofer and Dresner (2013) find statistically significant evidence at the 1% level that
“longer stage lengths are associated with a higher accident propensity” (Wang, Hofer and
Dresner, 2013).

86

the number of aircraft accident. I have statistically significant evidence at the 1% significance
level that when an airline is a budget airline, the expected value of an accident decreases by
79.16%.
As stated in section III, I hypothesize that an increase in the average stage length leads to
a decrease in the number of accidents as operators who provide short-haul services incur more
takeoffs and landings, which put the engines and aircraft under the most stress. Based on the
negative sign of the coefficient of the average stage length variable, this hypothesis is supported.
I also hypothesize the number of accidents increases when an airline is a budget airline as budget
airlines may spend less on safety in order to provide comparable services to non-budget airlines.
However, due to the negative sign of the estimated coefficient of the binary budget airline
variable, my hypothesis relating to budget airlines is not supported.
Intuitively the negative and statistically significant, at the 99% level, coefficients of both
independent variables of interest may be explained by airline business decisions. Based on my
results, an increase in average flight length leads to a decrease in the number of accidents. This
may mean that carriers that provide longer flights put more resources toward flight safety as
opposed to carriers which provide flights with shorter average stage lengths.17 After further
investigating the specific position of each accident during the flight, I find that 30.58% of
accidents occur while the aircraft is on the ground, 16.25% of accidents occur while at cruising
level, 44.35% occur during either takeoff or landing and 8.82% of accidents occur with an
“other” or undefined reason. Thus, it makes sense that short-haul carriers, that experience a
larger number of takeoffs and landings, have more accidents as 44.35% of accidents occur at
17
In testing the effect of average stage length on maintenance expenditure per aircraft, I find
statistically significant evidence that a 1-unit increase in flight length leads to an increase in
maintenance expenditure per aircraft. Thus I conclude that longer-haul carriers have higher
expenditure on maintenance per aircraft than that of their counterparts.
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takeoff and landing. Conversely, it makes sense that airlines that provide longer flight lengths
have fewer takeoffs and landings than their short-haul provider counterparts and thus incur a
smaller number of accidents. These results indicate that airlines that provides longer-haul flights
have inherently different operating methods and flight safety structures than those of shorter-haul
carriers.
Based on the results, when an airline is a budget airline, the number of accidents
decreases by an extremely large magnitude. Although these results may support the idea that
budget airlines may be sensitive to an unsafe reputation and thus may allocate more resources
toward safety than that of their counterparts in order to maintain strong reputations of safety,
after further investigation I find, this is not the case.18 While these results indicate that budget
airlines have different safety structures than that of non-budget or legacy airlines I am not
confident in my results regarding the budget airline variable. The unrealistically large coefficient
signifies an error within the application. I suspect measurement error of the budget airline
variable to be a large potential issue within my model which leaves me with little confidence in
my results associated to the budget airline variable.19
Ultimately these results indicate that a homogenous airline regulation framework is not
appropriate for budget nor long-haul airlines. With statistically significant evidence that both an
increase in average flight length and an airline being a budget airline lead to a decrease in the
number of aircraft accidents, it is apparent that not all airlines should be held to identical

18

In further investigation, I find statistically significant evidence at the 1% level that budget
airlines spend less on maintenance per aircraft than non-budget airlines.
19
It is worth noting that in testing the difference between accident rates of budget and nonbudget airlines, I find the mean of accidents for budget airlines to be .8133 while that of nonbudget airlines is 1.45. Thus my regression results and conclusions align with the variable within
my data set; thus I assume there to me measurement error within the variable and an “outside”
factor affecting the large decrease in accident rate of budget airlines.
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benchmarks. Airline business decisions have shown to significantly affect aircraft accident rates;
thus airlines should be regulated and upheld to specific standards based on these decisions.
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VIII.

Supporting Tables

Table 1: Airlines included in the Analysis and Available Observations for Each Airline
Airline

Available Data (Inclusive)

AirTran Airways

1995 - 2011

Alaska Airlines

1995 - 2015

Allegiant Air

2000 - 2015

America West Airlines

1995 - 2007

American Airlines

1995 - 2015

Continental Airlines

1995 - 2011

Delta Air Lines

1995 - 2015

Frontier Airlines

1995 - 2015

Hawaiian Airlines

1995 - 2015

JetBlue Airways

2000 - 2015

Northwest Airlines

1995 - 2009

Southwest Airlines

1995 - 2015

Spirit Airlines

1995 - 2015

United Airlines

1995 - 2015

US Airways

1995 - 2014
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Units

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of
Accidents

Count

283

1.282686

1.852146

0

9

Average Stage
Length

Total Miles
Flown / Aircraft
Departures

282

935.0396

278.6823

256.0417

1720.326

Budget Airline

Binary

282

.2659574

.4426272

0

1

Baggage Fee

Thousand U.S. $

252

108026.3

198955.6

20.54

1125846

Cancelation Fee

Thousand U.S. $

237

267122.2

460147.5

2690.4

3117848

Count

282

265.3815

235.9029

.9863014

971.8904

Airline

Number of
Aircraft in Fleet
Pilot and CoPilot Average
Salary

U.S. $

260

130379.8

113164.9

16694.64

1859096

Maintenance Per
Aircraft

Maintenance
Expenditure
($1,000)/ Fleet
Size

264

2420.938

996.9043

428.5007

5586.672

Total Revenue

Billion U.S. $

274

8.340641

9.127099

.0536117

41.08443

Number of
Incidents

Count

287

8.355401

10.39193

0

58

Number of Seats

ASM / Miles

282

160.6285

32.88094

93.34768

265.6832
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Table 3: Poisson Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

Average Stage
Length

.0005898
(.0001858)***

-.0010085
(.0003297)***

-.001009
(.0002927)***

Budget
Airline

-.6174235
(.2218317)***

-.6140813
(.1752401)***

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002912
(.0001192)**

-.0003702
(.000085)***

Fleet Size

.0041103
(.0006356)***

.0042339
(.0003065)***

Pilot Salary

-9.72e-07
(1.41e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0036111
(.0041183)

Number of
Incidents

.0033688
(.0055896)

Total Revenue

.0030551
(.0154579)

Intercept

-.3181392
(.1898117)*

1.181443
(.7035263)*

.6731913
(.2754536)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0095

0.3019

0.3031

Chi Squared

9.96

222.40

216.34

Number of
Observations

282

260

264

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level

94

Table 4: Poisson Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents

Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

Average Stage
Length

.0007448
(.00023)***

-.0008845
(.00029)***

-.0008721
(.00025)***

Budget

-.4748103
(.1541)***

-.4656173
(.12154)***

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002553
(.0001)**

-.00032
(.00007)***

Fleet Size

.0036048
(.00055)***

.0036592
(.00023)***

Pilot Salary

-8.53e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.003167
(.0036)

Number of
Incidents

.0029544
(.0049)

Total Revenue

.0026794
(.01355)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average
Stage Length

.0007184
(.0003591)**

-.0005928
(.0002924)**

-.0006922
(.0003893)*

-.0011078
(.000349)***

-.0011111
(.0003296)***

-.7184402
(.2333835)***

-.7916491
(.2245004)***

Budget
Airline
7.40e-07
(7.01e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

3.28e-07
(2.61e-07)

Maintenance
/ Aircraft

-.0002036
(.000133)

-.0000663
(.0001418)

-.0002223
(.0001257)*

-.0002559
(.0001094)**

Fleet Size

.0044434
(.0009075)***

.0042938
(.0010027)***

.0042367
(.0006174)***

.0044162
(.0002986)***

Pilot Salary

-1.80e-06
(2.05e-06)

-3.28e-06
(2.90e-06)

-9.61e-07
(1.14e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0018323
(.0040688)

-.0036962
(.0043345)

-.0064759
(.0043613)*

Number of
Incidents

.0132486
(.0059269)***

.018139
(.0079114)***

.0037346
(.0058818)

Total
Revenue

-.0226676
(.0324717)

-.0210113
(.0333182)

.0033395
(.0155194)

-.0060738
(.0040212)

Intercept

-.441502
(.353355)

.2237119
(.6562952)

.4707563
(.663461)

1.538596
(.7558503)*

1.450162
(.6742874)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0046

0.1718

0.1676

0.1864

0.1865

Chi Squared

4.00

225.76

225.04

254.70

237.78

Number of
Observations

282

244

230

260

264

Notes: Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level

96

Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average
Stage Length

.0009044
(.00045)**

-.00056
(.00028)**

-.0005847
(.00033)*

-.0009521
(.0003)***

-.0009337
(.00027)***

-.5315556
(.15305)***

-.5652535
(.1409)***

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

6.99e-07
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

2.77e-07
(.00000)

Maintenance
/ Aircraft

-.0001924
(.00012)

-.000056
(.00012)

-.0001911
(.00011)*

-.0002151
(.00009)**

Fleet Size

.0041975
(.00086)***

.0036268
(.00083)***

.0036416
(.00054)***

.0037113
(.00024)***

Pilot Salary

-1.70e-06
(.00000)

-2.77e-06
(.00000)

-8.26e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.0017309
(.00385)

-.0031221
(.00365)

-.0055662
(.00374)

Number of
Incidents

.0125155
(.00569)**

.0153216
(.00691)**

.00321
(.00505)

Total
Revenue

-.0214132
(.03074)

-.0177477
(.02811)

.0028704
(.01333)

-.0051043
(.00338)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 7: Generalized Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

.0007184
(.0003591)**

-.0005928
(.0002924)**

-.0006922
(.0003893)*

-.0011078
(.000349)***

-.0011111
(.0003296)***

-.7184398
(.2333834)***

-.791649
(.2245004)***

Budget
Airline
7.40e-07
(7.01e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

3.28e-07
(2.61e-07)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0002036
(.000133)

-.0000663
(.0001418)

-.0002223
(.0001257)*

-.0002559
(.0001094)**

Fleet Size

.0044434
(.0009075)***

.0042938
(.0010027)***

.0042367
(.0006174)***

.0044162
(.0002986)***

Pilot Salary

-1.80e-06
(2.05e-06)

-3.28e-06
(2.90e-06)

-9.61e-07
(1.14e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0018323
(.0040688)

-.0036962
(.0043345)

-.0064759
(.0043613)

Number of
Incidents

.0132486
(.0059269)***

.018139
(.0079114)***

.0037346
(.0058818)

Total Revenue

-.0226676
(.0324717)

-.0210113
(.0333182)

.0033396
(.0155194)

-.0060738
(.0040212)

Intercept

-.441502
(.353355)

.2237118
(.6562952)

.4707563
(.6634611)

1.538595
(.7558502)**

1.450162
(.6742874)**

Robust
Standard
Errors?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Pseudo R2

0.0046

0.1718

0.1676

0.1864

0.1865

Chi Squared

4.00

225.76

225.04

254.70

237.78

Number of
Observations

282

244

230

260

264

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 8: Generalized Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

.0009044
(.00045)**

-.00056
(.00028)**

-.0005847
(.00033)*

-.0009521
(.0003)***

-.0009337
(.00027)***

-.5315554
(.15305)***

-.5652534
(.1409)***

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

6.99e-07
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

2.77e-07
(.00000)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0001924
(.00012)

-.000056
(.00012)

-.0001911
(.00011)*

-.0002151
(.00009)**

Fleet Size

.0041975
(.00086)***

.0036268
(.00083)***

.0036416
(.00054)***

.0037113
(.00024)***

Pilot Salary

-1.70e-06
(.00000)

-2.77e-06
(.00000)

-8.26e-07
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

-.0017309
(.00385)

-.0031221
(.00365)

-.0055662
(.00374)

Number of
Incidents

.0125155
(.00569)**

.0153216
(.00691)**

.00321
(.00505)

Total Revenue

-.0214132
(.03074)

-.0177477
(.02811)

.0028704
(.01333)

-.0051043
(.00338)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 9: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0007067
(.0003892)*

-.0003581
(.0007181)

-.0004855
(.0008489)

-.0003422
(.0007117)

-.0003761
(.0005644)

-1.015469
(1.756771)

-.9040006
(1.641604)

Budget
Airline
-8.00e-08
(5.60e-07)

Baggage Fee
Cancelation
Fee

1.46e-08
(2.23e-07)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0000784
(.0001749)

-.0000348
(.0001956)

-.0000821
(.0001694)

Fleet Size

.0037966
(.0012328)***

.003085
(.0014513)**

.0037115
(.0012205)***

.0037001
(.0010353)***

Pilot Salary

-3.46e-06
(3.21e-06)

-3.85e-06
(3.42e-06)

-3.75e-06
(3.15e-06)

-3.70e-06
(2.96e-06)

Number of
Seats

.0020996
(.0116373)

-.0105001
(.0135941)

Number of
Incidents

-.0015042
(.0092532)

-.0022328
(.0127798)

-.0006037
(.0114217)
-.0025023

Total Revenue

-.0198427
(.0286438)

-.007008
(.0293961)

(.0092082)
-.0216388
(.019868)

-.0233521
(.0160176)

Intercept

2.718387
(.7503188)***

1.644222
(1.989476)

3.955269
(2.439316)

2.48019
(2.208632)

2.162544
(1.235409)*

Chi Squared

3.30

18.97

15.87

19.70

19.52

Number of
Observations

282

238

230

260

260

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 10: Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regression Interpretations (Marginal Effects)
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0007067
(.00039)*

-.0003581
(.00072)

-.0004855
(.00085)

-.0003422
(.00071)

-.0003761
(.00056)

-1.015469
(1.75677)

-.9040006
(1.6416)

Budget
Airline
Baggage Fee

-8.00e-08
(.00000)

Cancelation
Fee

1.46e-08
(.00000)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0000784
(.00017)

-.0000348
(.0002)

-.0000821
(.00017)

Fleet Size

.0037966
(.00123)***

.003085
(.00145)**

.0037115
(.00122)***

.0037001
(.00104)***

Pilot Salary

-3.46e-06
(.00000)

-3.85e-06
(.00000)

-3.75e-06
(.00000)

-3.70e-06
(.00000)

Number of
Seats

.0020996
(.01164)

-.0105001
(.01359)

-.0006037
(.01142)

Number of
Incidents

-.0015042
(.00925)

-.0022328
(.01278)

-.0025023
(.00921)

Total Revenue

-.0198427
(.02864)

-.007008
(.0294)

-.0216388
(.01987)

-.0233521
(.01602)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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Table 11: Re-defined Budget Variable Regressions
Dependent Variable: Number of Aircraft Accidents
Regressor

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Average Stage
Length

-.0011291
(.0003257)***

-.0011291
(.0003257)***

-.0010107
(.0003017)***

-.0003294
(.0007111)

-.0003649
(.000564)

Budget
Airline

-.9677346
(.2219163)***

-.9677344
(.2219163)***

-.955858
(.2032952)***

-.8518152
(1.811383)

-.7464848
(1.708464)

Maintenance /
Aircraft

-.0003749
(.0001323)***

-.0003749
(.0001323)***

-.0003526
(.0001056)***

-.0000837
(.0001694)

Fleet Size

.0041583
(.0006001)***

.0041583
(.0006001)***

.0041529
(.0003086)***

.0037185
(.0012219)***

.0037109
(.0010365)***

Pilot Salary

-1.23e-06
(1.47e-06)

-1.23e-06
(1.47e-06)

-3.71e-06
(3.15e-06)

-3.68e-06
(2.96e-06)

Number of
Seats

-.0054923
(.0040084)

-.0054923
(.0040084)

Number of
Incidents

-.0027056
(.0062859)

-.0027056
(.0062859)

-.0023595
(.0092196)

Total Revenue

.0050343
(.0151806)

.0050343
(.0151806)

-.0217331
(.0198984)

-.023557
(.0160326)

Intercept

1.987853
(.7174252)***

Type of
Regression

Negative
Binomial

1.987852
(.7174251)***
Generalized
Negative
Binomial

1.717778
(.6175659)***
Generalized
Negative
Binomial

2.392866
(2.194456)
Fixed Effects
Negative
Binomial

2.113079
(1.220386)*
Fixed Effects
Negative
Binomial

Robust
Standard
Errors?

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Pseudo R2

0.1974

0.1974

0.1984

Chi Squared

265.39

265.39

263.31

19.53

19.39

Number of
Observations

260

260

264

260

260

-.0057792
(.0036146)

-.0003993
(.0114145)

Notes: Standard Errors are given in parenthesis. *Significant at 10% level, **Significant at 5% level, ***Significant at 1% level
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